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Borderlanguage: Language Policy, Ideology and Identity in Ukraine 
-Вы говорите: язык... Да разве существует малороссийский язык? Я попросил раз 
одного хохла перевести следующую, первую попавшуюся мне фразу: "Грамматика 
есть искусство правильно читать и писать". Знаете, как он это перевел: "Храматыка 
е выскусьтво правыльно чытаты ы пысаты... " Что ж, это язык, по-вашему? 
самостоятельный язык? Да скорей, чем с этим согласиться, я готов позволить 
лучшего своего друга истолочь в ступе...  
 
You say:  language…as if the Little Russian language exists?  One time I asked a 
[derogatory term for Ukrainian] to translate the following, the first phrase that came to 
me:  “Grammar is an art of correctly reading and writing.”  Do you know, how he 
translated it:  “Khrammar is the yrt of corryctly ryding and wrytyng…”  What, that is a 
language, in your opinion?  An independent language?  Sooner than agreeing with that, I 
would pound my best friend in a mortar.  
   -Pigasiv, from “Rudin” by Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev 
 
Introduction 
 The way an individual identifies himself is complicated, and is constantly being 
negotiated.  Race, ethnicity, class, occupation, and a myriad of other factors play a role in the 
construct of identity; near the top of the list, as well, is language.  For many people, language is 
not simply the way that they communicate, but a part of their very being.  Scholars have long 
found language and identity to be inextricably intertwined, and this connection becomes clearest 
when a group of speakers feels that their language is being threatened; as one example, the 
debate over Spanish in American schools can become extremely heated, even in areas far from 
any borders and with a limited Spanish-speaking population.  An attack on a language is felt, by 
many, to be an attack on identity itself. 
 While it is clear that there is a compelling connection between language and identity, the 
precise effect that language has on identity can be varying.  In some situations, language can 
strengthen the bonds that a group has between its members, and in others, language may not be 
as important as other cultural factors such as race or religion in expressing identity.  In order to 
Borderlanguage: Language Policy, Ideology and Identity in Ukraine Susan Vdovichenko 
P a g e  | 2 
 
 
 
completely understand the linguistic situation in Ukraine, we must first fully examine how 
language and identity interact, and what aspects of the Ukrainian culture are relevant to this 
issue. 
 In this paper, I will be examining the theoretical framework of identity:  how identity is 
defined, the scholarly framework of identity which is best suited for the purposes of this study, 
and the different ways that this framework has been applied by scholars, and how these ideas of 
identity and negotiation have played out in multilingual contexts.  I will also look at the role that 
stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes have to strengthen and complicate the issue of language 
and identity, and explore how language and language attitudes affect identity formation and 
negotiation, both positively and negatively.  Once these theoretical issues are understood, the 
motivations behind the current linguistic situation in Ukraine become much clearer. 
Identity 
Social identity theory 
 Identity theory has been studied for decades by sociologists, and through the 1970s, the 
primary focus of identity study was the individual.  For many, this made intuitive sense; identity 
is defined by Merriam Webster as “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual: 
individuality.”1  In the past few decades, though, it has become clear that an individual’s identity 
is dependent on more than simply the individual himself, and actually relies on both the 
individual and the social groups that the individual considers himself to be a part of.  Since then, 
identity has been studied more as it pertains to the idea of the group (Cerulo, 1997).  This idea of 
“social identity” is widely accepted in current studies of identity; simply put, social identity 
theory follows the idea that the behavior of an individual reflects the society of which the 
                                                 
1 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity, accessed on 15 August 2009. 
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individual is a part (Padilla & Perez, 2003: 42).  In other words, the individual’s identity is 
inextricably tied to the social group of which they are a part. 
 According to Padilla and Perez, social identity theory incorporates three important ideas:  
individuals are motivated to keep a positive self-concept, this self-concept comes from the 
identity of the individual within the group, and that people build their favorable social identity by 
comparing their group in a positive way against an out-group.  The process of social identity thus 
allows for group members to construct their identity in a way that feels right, while alienating 
those from outside groups.  It is perhaps as a result of this process of alienation that intergroup 
conflict often occurs, as viewing an outside group in an unfavorable way is an important part of 
the construction of identity. 
The idea of intergroup conflict becomes more understandable when one takes into 
account the different needs of the individual.  “[S]ocial identifications are guided by two core 
human motives: the need to be unique and the need to belong.  Having a social identity (e.g., 
ethnic, religions, or national) satisfies individuals’ simultaneous needs for inclusion and 
differentiation.  In other words, we need to simultaneously fill the need to belong to a social 
group (e.g., Latino) while maintaining our distinctiveness from another group (e.g., Jewish)” 
(Padilla & Perez, 43).  Social identity theory does not simply explain why individuals may define 
themselves in terms of the group that they belong to, but it also helps to explain why members of 
outside groups are portrayed in a more negative light. 
Brewer (2001) separates identity into four separate types of social identity:  person-based 
social identities (how an individual fits into a group), relational social identities (how a small 
relationship group, such as a family, fits into a group), group-based social identities (the 
collective qualities of the group), and collective identities (the achievement of collective efforts, 
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such as shaping of a group identity, beyond what the group already has in common).  In this way, 
even the idea of social identity is not as simple as it originally sounds, but rather, each member 
of the group is negotiating their own identity in a variety of ways as they construct their 
individuality and group membership.  This particular way of looking at social identity can help to 
explain how social identity cannot be a simple concept; an individual is constantly negotiating 
their own identity in relation to the group as well as the group’s identity in relation to society as a 
whole. 
The application of social identity theory 
As identity is being more completely understood, the application of social identity can be 
found in a variety of ways.  It is important to understand exactly how current theories of social 
identity are being applied, especially as it pertains to linguistic groups, in order to see the big 
picture in Ukraine. 
 In the beginning, social identity was seen primarily as a collective identity.  The members 
of a group were believed to internalize physiological, psychological, and regional traits of the 
group, which led to the idea of a unified group from which individuals derived their sense of self 
(Cerulo, 1997).  The idea was that all members of a group retain essentially the same identity, 
and this identity was determined not by the members of the group, but by outside or higher 
forces.  Cerulo mentions Nazi Germany as an example of this; the characteristics of the group 
were set, and the group members adhered to these characteristics. 
This theory has been adapted in more recent times to reflect a more social view, known 
as Social Constructionism:  “From this perspective, every collective becomes a social artifact – 
an entity molded, refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers 
of power” (Cerulo, 1997: 387).  In this way, group dynamics interact with the identity of the 
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individual; each individual changes the identity of the whole group, just as belonging to the 
group changes the identity of each individual.  Using this theory, the members of the group 
perpetuate the group identity by reinforcing the characteristics of the group.  Cerulo cites gender 
studies to illustrate this theory, stating that belonging to a male or female group does not, in and 
of itself, result in male or female stereotypical behaviors, but the members of society and 
reinforce those stereotypes, perpetuating the identity of the group. 
When it comes to national identity, “[a] rich collection of sociohistorical works on 
commemoration, narrative, and symbolization chart the ways in which actors, particularly elites, 
create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies” 
(Cerulo, 1997: 390).  The identity of an ethnic group is therefore enabled by the entire group as 
well as shaped by it.  In this way, the identity of each individual in a national group is tied to the 
national characteristic, even as the national characteristics are dependent on the individual.  
The issue of national identity becomes more complicated, though, because it is on one 
hand the organic dynamics of a group, and on the other hand, it is often conscientiously 
manipulated by those in power.  Because of this, Anthony D. Smith (1991) suggests that national 
identity, which can share many characteristics with linguistic identity, should be analyzed 
somewhere between social constructionism and the more essentialist earlier views, citing a “need 
for community” as an important aspect of this type of identity.  It is neither simply the 
characteristics of a group as dictated from above, nor the characteristics of a group as determined 
and continued by the members of that group, but a mixture. 
The most recent type of identity theory to come out of the scholarship is Postmodernism.  
The basic tenet of postmodern identity theory is that earlier theories are too constricted in their 
views of identity. The theory holds that each individual is too multifaceted to be boxed into one 
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group or another, and that working on the idea that social identity can define an individual’s 
identity is simplifying the issue (Cerulo, 1997).  Postmodernism has been especially useful in 
discussing gender and sexuality identity, attempting to break down ideas about strict categories 
that people fall into.   
For purposes of this study, it is important to keep all three approaches in mind (collective 
identity, social constructionism, and postmodernism); the group of Russian-speakers in Ukraine 
will certainly be multifaceted, and will both define itself and be defined from above.  The main 
approach will be social constructionism, as the analysis of the study is based on data recorded 
during a specific period of time in Ukraine.  Social constructionism relies on variables and 
correlates, which were chosen as the most adequate way to study the situation in Ukraine today.  
While I do not believe that postmodernism alone can be easily applied to the issue of national or 
linguistic identity, as both national identity and linguistic identity have relatively clear-cut 
boundaries and individuals often choose or are given definitive labels, there are certain aspects of 
postmodernism that apply to this situation.  Mainly, identity in a context such as Ukraine can go 
through re-negotiation on a daily basis, and thus it is important to try to understand deeper, 
individual qualities; qualitative data from the surveys and interviews will help to shed light on 
some of these qualities.  For these reasons, we will be looking at the situation in Ukraine through 
an adapted lens of social constructionism, remembering that many of the qualities that are 
ascribed to Russian and Ukrainian speakers may be given to them from above, and remembering 
to keep in mind individuals and the way that they may define themselves as well as their group. 
Language and language attitudes in identity formation 
 Language has been found to be connected to identity, but it becomes even more 
complicated when language attitudes are considered; the way members from within as well as 
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outside of the linguistic group have toward the language play a large part in the formation of the 
collective and individual identity.  In this section, social identity theory will be considered as it 
applies to language, and language ideology and its connection to identity will be studied.   
Language and social identity theory 
 Social identity theory has been used to help explain many different aspects of identity, as 
stated earlier. Language is certainly an important part of one’s identity, and especially in a 
bilingual society, being a member of a certain linguistic group often plays a defining role in an 
individual’s sense of self.   
 It is difficult to definitively state how language and identity interact, because in different 
situations, language use will carry a different amount of significance.  In monolingual societies, 
individuals may attach little significance to their linguistic group; alternatively, in multi-ethnic 
societies, many different ethnic groups may speak the same language, rendering its status as a 
group-marker as ineffective.  Because of this, language may be a deciding factor in a group, but 
it does not have to be (Renan, 1990).  In certain situations, especially multilingual societies, 
language choice may be critical to identity, while in others, it may be far less important. 
 Looking at language in this light, it is tempting to assume that language is not important 
to the formation of identity.  This is a mistake, however.  While language may not be a primary 
marker in all situations, it maintains strong associations with national and ethnic identity (May, 
2008).  Regardless of the situation of a given language group, language is often deeply tied 
together with the idea of national identity.  When the political situation of a given language 
group is such that it is a marker of minority or majority status, the significance of the language in 
terms of identity is strengthened.  “If a particular language comes to serve important cultural 
and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular ethnic or national 
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identity, it is important” (May, 130).  Thus, while language may play a minor role in identity 
formation in certain situations (e. g. monolingual societies), it can be a critical factor in other 
situations (e.g. bilingual societies). 
An example of the significance of language to national identity in a bilingual setting can 
be seen in the Catalonia region in Spain, where Catalonian and Spanish compete for the same 
space.  In this area, the language is perceived by both sides to hold significant value not only for 
its speakers, but for the group and the nation as a whole.  On one side, Catalan nationalists view 
Catalonian as a symbol of their culture with a long and celebrated history, while on the other, 
some Spanish speakers view Catalonian as a threat to the nation (Rees, 1996).  This situation is a 
clear illustration of how language choice, especially in a highly-charged bilingual situation, 
becomes connected not simply to the way that people speak, but who people are.  “Multi-cultural 
nations throughout the world are undergoing varying degrees of language-related stress with 
separatist overtones. In Barcelona, the succinct slogan often seen on ‘tee’ shirts and in graffiti, 
Som catalans, no som espanyoles, (We are Catalans, not Spaniards) hints at independence for 
cultural survival” (Rees, 1996: 319).  While language can play a secondary role in identity 
formation in many situations, there is no doubt that, given the right political environment, 
geographic space, and linguistic situation, language is a central factor to identity. 
David Kaplan (1994) discusses the linguistic situation in Canada, where French and 
English groups contend for the same space.  He writes that the language policy in Quebec 
separates French-speaking Quebec from English-speaking Canada, allowing each territory to use 
language to determine its social, economic, and cultural makeup.  Kaplan shows that the 
language situation has, through the use of politics and group identity, grown to encompass more 
than just communication, but has effectively divided Canada.   
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As we think about the study of identity in terms of social constructionism, it is thus not 
difficult to see language as a critical part of a person’s identity.  In a mostly bilingual society, 
language can be a choice, and that choice can help to construct one’s identity; when the use of 
that language has social, economical, and political implications, the choice of language can be 
the deciding factor for an individual in terms of which group they belong to; this can expand to 
include the role that the entire language group plays in society.  Looking at identity through a 
postmodernist lens, language choice can be seen as a way that an individual negotiates their 
individual identity, while the language group as a whole interacts with society.   
Language Attitudes and Identity  
 The idea of how language interacts with identity becomes even more complicated with 
the addition of language attitudes and ideology.  In theory, linguistic choices simply reflect the 
group to which an individual belongs, constructing and maintaining an identity for that 
individual, and possibly constructing a group identity.  In practice, though, there is more at stake 
than simply the categorization of an individual.  Economics and power are certainly important to 
the choices that individuals make, but the attitudes of individuals and a society as a whole toward 
a language and its speakers become a critical part of the identity construction; negative attitudes 
between different groups of speakers can increase the strength of the ties between identity and 
language, and increased strength of ties between identity and language can increase negative 
attitudes toward speakers who belong to a different language group. 
 What is important to remember about language in a multilingual society is that it is often, 
at least on some level, consciously chosen.  Edwards (1983) did a study in Guyana regarding the 
use of Standard English, Creole English, and an intermediate code.  What is interesting about this 
study is that it looks specifically at the way that these languages are used by males in Guyana, all 
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of whom have significant exposure to each of the three varieties.  In Guyana, Edwards found that 
rural speakers used Creole English, urban speakers used Standard English, and new immigrants 
from the rural areas to the city used a mix, using the least stigmatized forms of Creole English 
combined with Standard English forms.  Urban speakers view rural speakers, and Creole 
English, as backwards and uneducated, which helps to explain why they overwhelmingly used 
Standard English in the interviews.  Conversely, rural speakers in Guyana view urban speakers 
as untrustworthy, which helps to explain why they choose an identity that links them to other 
rural speakers.  New immigrants to the city face pressures in both directions. 
 There is nothing that is surprising about this type of data.  Linguists have long found 
speakers to adapt their speech to their situation, and Guyana happens to show a very clear-cut 
example.  However, what is important here is the motivation behind these linguistic choices; 
attitudes toward one language or another allows for very specific pressure to center around how a 
person speaks.  Rather than speakers finding a common language and accommodating each 
other, which often happens in register shifts, speakers are choosing to use a language to avoid 
possible negative attitudes, or to garner positive attitudes, that are held about the language 
choice. 
Identity Negotiation in a Multilingual Context  
 It is clear that language and identity are intertwined, and many people feel that language 
connects them to their personal identity group.  In a multilingual context, especially one with 
changing definitions of power and negotiation of public space, this relationship is strengthened.  
“In the continuum between those poles are territories still in the process of consolidating a 
cultural hold on their space. For them the path toward asserting identity is self-conscious and 
often facilitated by legal codification. Language is now often considered the most important 
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factor in defining who this group is” (Gade, 2003: 429).  Although there are many factors that 
can determine identity, when language and power are in flux, language is often vital to an 
individual’s identity. 
 Gade discusses the “scriptoral landscape” of a given area, which is the way that written 
language presents itself in physical space, and notes that written language is visible proof of the 
cultural hold on the area.  This scriptoral landscape includes official and professionally produced 
signs, but it also is made up of unofficial linguistic elements such as graffiti, banners, and 
inscriptions.  In this way, while the official language is legally codified, there is a negotiation of 
space that keeps language in the public consciousness. 
 Gade studied two cities, a French-speaking city in Canada and a Catalan-speaking city in 
Spain, and their similarities with the cities that are to be studied in this paper are striking.  In 
each of these cities the majority language of the city is different than that of the country, and that 
is the first distinction that comes up when discussing other parts of the country.  The inhabitants 
of both of the cities use language to discuss character differences, as “[m]any Catalans describe 
their group as being better educated and more in tune with the whole of Europe than are other 
people in Spain. Reference is made to seny - a word with no equivalent in Castilian - as a special 
human quality that incorporates common wisdom and a sense of equilibrium that is claimed as a 
distinguishing feature of Catalans. Quebecois have frequently seen themselves as more fun 
loving - the joie de vivre metaphor - and less materialistic than English-Canadian” (434).  Gade’s 
study illustrates how, in a multilingual context, characteristics are attributed to language groups 
and entire cities and regions. 
 These different characteristics push bilingual speakers to negotiate their identity and use 
their speech as a way to define who they are.  Aneta Pavlenko discusses the way that language 
Borderlanguage: Language Policy, Ideology and Identity in Ukraine Susan Vdovichenko 
P a g e  | 12 
 
 
 
and identity are intertwined, particularly in situations where there is an unequal distribution of 
power.  Negotiated identities, she explains, are those which can be contested by individuals and 
groups (2003).  In a multilingual setting, choice of language can, and often does, project certain 
attributes about an individual.  For those who identify themselves primarily based on language, 
their use of language reinforces their status as members of the group.  For others, language 
choice helps to project certain characteristics that they wish to attribute to themselves, and is a 
tool that is used to support their identity, rather than the primary means of identification.   
Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes 
Stigma 
 Stigma can play a strong role in determining how identity is formed, especially when we 
assume that identity is a social construct.  According to Goffman (1963), stigma is a 
characteristic that is present in an individual that is seen as departing, in a negative way, from the 
norms of society.  One type of stigma, most relevant to our purposes, is tribal; race, nation, and 
religion, all of which are transmitted genetically and apply equally to all members of a family.  
Although Goffman does not list language as a specific example of this type of stigma, it fits 
within his definition, being transmitted through lineages and inflicting families.   
Stigma has a negative effect on individuals, and the individual that carries a stigma is 
often shunned in various ways by other members of society, and that somebody with a stigma is 
viewed by other members of society as being not quite human.  As we negotiate our identity, 
Goffman argues that people will often try to hide certain aspects of themselves, to minimize the 
stigma involved. 
 As Padilla and Perez (2003) point out, stigma varies from one situation to another, as a 
certain attribute may be normal in one society but a marker of stigma in another.  What seems to 
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be universal about stigmatized attributes, however, is the association of a lack of power with the 
characteristic; high social standing and power are associated with a much lower risk of stigma.  
Stigmatized attributes may be anything from mental handicap to gender, style of dress to 
religion, as long as the characteristic is associated with powerless in society and a minority 
standing. 
 Goffman highlights the importance of the visibility of a particular stigma.  If a 
stigmatized characteristic is apparent to everybody who encounters the individual, this 
characteristic will hold great importance for the individual.  Some examples of these types of 
stigma are physical handicap or race.  A stigma that is immediately available to the rest of 
society becomes, of course, highly significant to that individual’s identity.   
 There are other stigma, however, that are not readily visible to other members of society.  
An example of this type of stigma is sexual orientation.  In the case of a stigma that is not visible, 
the individual has two choices, to attempt to “pass,” that is, to monitor the way they dress, act, 
and look in order to hide the stigmatized characteristic from those in society, or, as Padilla points 
out, “other individuals may actually make a conscious decision to display their stigma by 
wearing signs or symbols that convey their stigmatized identity or engage in collective 
manifestations that demonstrate their identity with a stigmatized group (e.g., gay 
pride parade)” (45-46).  While it is immediately clear that visible stigma plays a critical role in 
the formation of identity, non-visible stigma is critical in a different way; for some, it is the fear 
of being, as Goffman calls it, “discredited,” while for others, it becomes a conscious marker of 
identity.  Language choice can be seen as a type of stigma that is readily available, especially in a 
monolingual individual, but it can also be something that is hidden, and some speakers of a 
stigmatized language may simply choose to keep quiet rather than be discredited. 
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 Stigmatized members of society, for the most part, are aware of the negative ideas that 
are placed upon their group by other members of society, and, for example, immigrant groups 
may actually rebel against acculturation if they believe that their group is being discriminated 
against by the majority group (Padilla & Perez, 2003).  The existence of stigma, therefore, often 
increases the amount of resistance between groups, and may make coexistence more difficult.   
 An additional factor in stigma, discrimination, and identity is the idea of self-esteem.  
Self-esteem has been found to be tied up with a strong connection to a group.  If a group views 
itself positively in comparison to an outgroup, individual members within the group have higher 
self-esteems (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003).  This fits in with the theories above that 
group membership fosters identity construction, but it also solidifies discrimination and 
stigmatization:  “Collective self-esteem is not just a reaction to positive feelings toward the 
ingroup but involves a comparison with an outgroup, and the outgroup often loses in the 
comparison. People give higher ratings to ingroup members than to outgroup members on the 
same tasks (ingroup favoritism); and focusing on the negative aspects of the outgroup and the 
positive aspects of the ingroup (which is inherently part of group differentiation) makes ingroup 
members feel better about their group” (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 521).  In other words, 
the association of an individual with a group can lead to an increase in negative attitudes and 
stigma of the other group.   
Language Discrimination 
 Stigmatized language groups often face language discrimination; language groups that 
are the focus of linguistic discrimination may find themselves increasingly stigmatized.  
Especially in situations where one language is given obvious preferential treatment and preferred 
status, the stigma becomes more ingrained.   
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In the past few decades, linguistic rights and linguistic discrimination have been more 
thoroughly studied by scholars.  According to Paulston (1997), the vast majority of works on the 
subject of linguistic rights have been done since 1979, much of which is either absolutely 
descriptive and with little attention paid to the consequences of linguistic rights or strongly 
ideologically biased.  Paulston’s article attempts to find middle ground, defining linguistic 
human rights as “derive[ing] from the attempt to link language with human rights, i.e. to re- 
frame the issues of language rights in terms of human rights, now a generally accepted notion” 
(76) and discussing the consequences of linguistic human rights.   
An interesting point that Paulston makes from the beginning, which is relevant to our 
purposes, is the tendency of many scholars to discuss linguistic and ethnic groups in terms of 
minority and majority, although it is better to discuss them in terms of privileged and 
nonprivileged.  The number of speakers of a language may not be indicative of the power that the 
language group holds. 
Paulston describes two different ways that nations’ policies tend to take linguistic 
differences into account:  territoriality and personality.  With a territoriality principle, the 
language of the territory is imposed on the entire area.  With the personality principle, the 
individual chooses their own language, and the linguistic policy of each area within a territory 
more or less reflects the linguistic makeup of that area.  There are two basic factors that come 
into play when determining language policy:  environment and goals.  If the goals of the nation 
are perceived as more important than the actual linguistic makeup, the nation is likely to adopt 
territoriality policies, and vice versa.  
In 1996, UNESCO and other non-profits met in Barcelona and designed a “universal 
declaration of human rights.  Article 3 section 2 states: 
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“This Declaration considers that the collective rights of language groups, may include the 
following, in addition to the rights attributed to the members of language groups in the 
foregoing paragraph, and in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 2.2:  
• the right for their own language and culture to be taught;  
• the right of access to cultural services;  
• the right to an equitable presence of their language and culture in the communications 
media;  
• the right to receive attention in their own language from government bodies and in 
socioeconomic relations” (http://www.unesco.org/most/lnngo11.htm, accessed on August 
28, 2009). 
Although the declaration uses the term “may” with regards to these rights, the basic desire of a 
linguistic group to have specific access to their language comes across very clearly.  This is often 
reflected in the desire for language choice in schools, official documents, and media.   
 According to Dunbar (2001), the reasoning behind these types of rights is based on the 
idea that, as language is fundamental to identity, lack of services in a given language can be seen 
as an attack on an individual’s sense of self.  Further, many who support these types of rights see 
language diversity as something that is positive in and of itself, and that linguistic diversity 
should be supported.     
Linguistic Stereotypes 
 Closely tied to the problem of linguistic discrimination and stigma is the use of 
stereotypes that are created to reflect beliefs about a certain linguistic group.  According to 
Meriam Webster Dictionary, a stereotype is “something conforming to a fixed or general pattern; 
especially : a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of a group and that 
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represents an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment” 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stereotype, accessed on 8/29/09).    
According to Kunda and Sinclair (1999), social psychologists generally look at two 
motivations for the creation and propagation of stereotypes: dissonance theory and attribution 
theory.  In dissonance theory, the stereotypes are created to reduce the amount of perceived 
distance between two groups, and with attribution theory, the stereotypes help to reinforce self-
worth of the in-group members.  Although Kunda and Sinclair point out that the idea of 
motivation for stereotypes was not always without controversy, most social psychologists2 now 
believe that stereotypes can be motivated by desires.  Furthermore, “for the most part, research 
on the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning has focused on demonstrating motivated 
activation and use of cognitive elements, and research has shown that people are especially likely 
to activate and use those beliefs, concepts, and rules most likely to support their desired 
conclusion” (Kunda and Sinclair, 13). 
Edwards’ 1983 Guyana study (cited above) exemplifies this point, as rural and urban 
speakers made specific language choices based on the least stigmatized form of Creole or 
Standard English, depending on their situation; one type of language protected the speakers from 
being perceived as backwards and uneducated, while another choice presumably increased their 
trustworthiness.  In both cases, the stereotypes about speakers of the other variety of the 
language allowed for increased distance between the two groups as well as an increased level of 
self-worth based on the chosen language. 
Another example of linguistic stereotypes is found in the Garinagu-speaking area of 
Belize, where Garinagu speakers carry a stereotype of being lower class and even “savage,” 
                                                 
2 See Kunda and Sinclair, pp. 12-14 
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Spanish speakers are stereotyped as privileged outsiders that are “hotheaded,” and Creole 
speakers are seen as wealthy and adaptable, and authentically “Belizeans” (Bonner, 2001).  
Bonner discusses the various stereotypes that exist for the residents of the multilingual town of 
Dangriga, pointing out that the influx of Spanish-speaking immigrants has increased the 
motivation and strength of the stereotypes amongst all of the groups.  The situation is 
complicated, as language choice in this area signifies affiliation with a specific group, but also is 
seen by many as an indicator of more than communication choice. 
“Garinagu possess a more secure position within the imaginings of the Belizean nation 
than do ‘Spanish.’ The precarious nature of Creole status and hegemony, coupled with 
xenophobic fears of ‘Spanish’ takeover, lead some Creoles to reach out to Garinagu as 
individuals with whom they share an African heritage. The heightened popularity in 
Belize and elsewhere of philosophies of the African diaspora, such as Rastafarianism and 
Afrocentrism, also encourages connections between members of these two groups. 
However, Garinagu have paid dearly for the possibility of affiliation with Creole 
Belizean national culture. Optimistically speaking, they have made Creoles their allies, 
thus forging connections to this other, more powerful local community of the African 
diaspora. Nonetheless, the price they have paid is the shame that Garifuna youth feel 
about the use of their native language in multiethnic contexts” (Bonner, 92). 
 Not surprisingly, Kunda and Sinclair cite several studies that show that people are more 
likely to apply negative stereotypes to members of other groups when they have, for example, 
just felt an attack on their self-worth.  The example in Belize illustrates this, as negative 
stereotypes are more strongly applied when outside groups enter the situation, and there is less 
power and prestige available for everybody.   
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History of Ukrainian in Ukraine 
While the issue of a national language in Ukraine is currently an important subject for 
nearly all of the inhabitants of Ukraine, history shows that this has been a sensitive issue in 
Ukraine for centuries.  One of the major reasons for this is that Ukraine has had such a troubled 
past, only emerging from under the rule of other nations in 1991.   
Going back centuries, Ukraine has been alternately under the rule of Tatars, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Russia.  Although the relationship between the Ukrainians and their rulers varied, 
the fact that the Ukrainian language and culture consistently survived various rules speaks to the 
strength of the Ukrainian people, and their unwillingness to see their way of life destroyed.  
Czubatyj writes, “By six hundred years of effort to reassert and to rehabilitate themselves in the 
face of enormous odds, the Ukrainians preserved their nation” (104). There has been a strong 
drive to keep Ukrainian alive, often associated with patriotism; now that Ukrainian is the state 
language, the connection of nationalism to Ukrainian heightens tension with Russian speakers.  
This complicates the issue – it does not boil down to merely a struggle for comprehension or 
rights, but has been, in some way or another, a part of every Ukrainian’s history. 
With the advent of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians were able to speak Ukrainian; originally, 
Ukrainianization was used under Lenin’s rule as a means to justify Soviet power.  In the 1920s, 
the Communist Party worked within the individual nations to include non-Russians so as to 
strengthen the party (Liber, 1982).  Lenin’s policy on Ukrainian helped to support the language, 
which allowed for an early revival. 
Although the USSR originally strengthened the Ukrainian language, the Russian 
language was used throughout the USSR as a lingua franca between republics.  Because of this, 
the use of the Russian language was encouraged in Ukraine (Chamberlin, 1945). 
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“While basic instruction in the non-Russian republics is guaranteed in the local 
languages, Russian is the official language, and its study as a second language is 
compulsory in native schools. Moreover, upward mobility - especially in scientific and 
political arenas-depends on local elites' mastery of the Russian language and cultural 
norms, while Russians experience little pressure to master the languages of the republics 
in which they live and work. Shifts in language policy, which may have been intended to 
promote national integration, were interpreted as efforts at further Russification and have 
generated severe resistance and even massive demonstrations” (Lapidus, 104). 
 
Even when Ukrainian was recognized under the Soviet Union, there was general governmental 
pressure for the Soviet people to learn and operate in Russian.  This contributed to mixing of the 
two languages. 
 The support for Ukrainian under the Soviet Union was short-lived, however, and only 
the dedication of Ukrainian speakers kept the language alive.  During Stalin’s reign, the use of 
Ukrainian was “tatamount to treason” (Petherbridge-Hernandez and Raby, 38); still, the 
Ukrainian language survived.  The political atmosphere only fueled greater emotional connection 
to the use of language. 
 After Stalin, the pressure against Ukrainian was more subversive and less overt.  Under 
Khrushchev, Ukrainian schools were allowed, but they were staffed by lower quality teachers 
and the level of education was inferior to Russian schools.  “It was widely accepted that having a 
Russian-language education increased the chances of entering higher education and getting a 
better job.  Russian schools tended to have better-trained teachers, and entrance examinations 
were usually in Russian” (Bilaniuk 90).  Thus, high levels of education were connected with the 
use of the Russian language. 
 During the second half of the twentieth century, the divide between east and west in 
Ukraine became pronounced.  “By 1970 east Ukraine had become more Russified, especially in 
the cities, but west Ukraine remained loyal to Ukrainian,” (Szporluk, 93).  Given the political 
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situation, the use of language came to symbolize more than communication, but was a political 
choice – with their utterances, speakers showed a loyalty to their history or a loyalty to the Soviet 
Union, and effectively took a political stand. 
“Extensive data on Ukrainian bilingualism is offered by Yaroslav Bilinsky in his study, 
based to a large extent on interviews with former Soviet citizens. His evidence reveal a 
great deal of pressure, subtle and otherwise, in favor of Russian. According to defector 
testimony, on the eve of World War II, and undoubtedly at present, ‘if an educated 
Ukrainian in one of the large cities, who was fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian, chose 
to speak his native language, this was regarded not only as a sign of mauvais ton, but as 
Ukrainian nationalism, an act of political insubordination’” (Ornstein, 13-14). 
 
In spite of the political pressure, Ukrainian managed to survive in villages and amongst 
nationalists.  It is not surprising that certain stereotypes sprung up about Ukrainian speakers, 
connecting the use of the language with village life and lack of education or strong nationalistic 
tendencies. 
The mixing of the two languages contributed to their similarities; there was a concerted 
effort by the Soviet Union to “Russify” Ukrainian, in order for the language to sound more like 
Russian (Bilaniuk, 2005).  The efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to Russify Ukrainian 
contributed to the current similarities between the two languages, and the blurring of the 
boundaries between linguistic groups, as we saw earlier in the paper, increases a need for social 
differentiation. 
 Recently, the issue of language has come into focus as Ukraine gained its independence.  
In 1989, the Law on Languages made Ukrainian the official language of Ukrainian SSR; in 1990, 
the USSR declared Russian the official language of the entire Soviet Union.  When Ukraine 
gained independence in 1991, Ukrainian again became the state language, which resulted in a 
surge of Ukrainian use.  When the economy fell apart, however, Ukrainian fell out of favor, and 
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in 1993, Russian was more widely popular.  During the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukrainian 
was very strongly tied to national pride, and since then, there has been an upsurge of Ukrainian 
used, as well as an increase in the positive stereotypes connected to the users of the language 
(Bilaniuk 2005). 
Taken on the surface, the linguistic situation in Ukraine today seems to be simple:  
approximately half of the country speaks Ukrainian, and half speaks Russian as its native tongue.  
But coupled with the sociolinguistic values of national identity as well as the history of 
Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine, it soon becomes clear that the issue is complicated and 
delicate.  Every Ukrainian is touched by this issue; as language is so closely intertwined with 
identity, it is a very personal matter.  Language is shaping the politics of the country, and 
affecting the way that Ukrainians from all over the country view themselves and each other.   
Study methodology 
 For this study, I traveled to Ukraine during October and November of 2009.  I spent 
approximately two weeks in each of the cities of Kherson, Kyiv, Simferopol’, and Kharkov.  
While each of the cities is primarily Russian speaking, each city has specific demographic 
characteristics that make its population unique.  Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, is a young, vibrant, 
and liberal city.  As it is the political center of the country, it is also the concentration of positive 
ideology geared towards the Ukrainian language and there is a strong focus on increasing the use 
of Ukrainian.  Simferopol’ is the capital of the Crimean region; as Crimea was gifted to Ukraine 
under Khrushchev, and it houses a large Russian naval center, many Crimeans consider 
themselves to actually be a part of Russian.  Further, Crimea is the only region in Ukraine that is 
considered an autonomous region rather than an oblast’, which means that it is not subject to the 
same laws as the rest of the country, including some laws on language requirements.  Thus, 
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many in Simferopol’ consider themselves to be genetically Russian and are less subject to the 
positive ideology about Ukrainian.  Kharkov, in the far east of Ukraine, is geographically very 
close to Russia, and the entire region has a very high level of Russian speakers.  Kherson, on the 
other hand, is in the south, and is a Russian-speaking city surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking 
villages.   
 Over the course of eight weeks, I collected 101 questionnaires from the respondents in 
the four cities.  I solicited responses from acquaintances and their acquaintances, as well as 
approaching random people in parks.  I chose to use both strategies because gathering 
questionnaires through acquaintances presented certain biases (such as belonging to the same 
general social circles or regions of the cities), but approaching random strangers made it 
impossible to control for variables such as education, and the majority of people who were 
willing to take questionnaires from a stranger were older women.  By gathering questionnaires in 
two different ways, I was able to mitigate the disadvantages of each method. 
 The questions on the surveys concerned identity, language use, attitudes, linguistic 
ideology, language maintenance, and language stereotypes.  There was a mixture of multiple 
choice questions and open-ended questions, and the respondents were encouraged to write 
additional comments to questions.  All of the respondents identified themselves as native 
speakers of Russian. 
Relevant Research Questions 
 When it comes to the current linguistic situation in Ukraine and the role that identity 
plays in the situation, there are several research questions that must be addressed.  First and 
foremost, how are Ukrainians currently identifying themselves?  In order to understand how 
identity and language interact, it is critical to understand the way that Russian-speaking 
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Ukrainians see themselves:  primarily based on their language, their ethnicity, or their 
geographical location.  The way that Ukrainians self-identify will be critical in understanding 
current language attitudes. 
 Along these same lines, it will be important to understand whether feelings of identity 
vary depending on demographics.  The way that age, region, and gender affect how people 
identify may reflect not only the way that linguistic policy is affecting different groups of people 
differently, but also how the situation is changing. 
 Is there a correlation between identity and language attitudes?  If so, what kinds of 
correlations, why do they exist, and how do they manifest themselves? 
 Understanding the way that these issues are currently being played out in Ukraine will 
help to explain the current linguistic situation.  There is no doubt that identity is connected to 
language; exactly how that correlation works in Ukraine is critical to understanding the overall 
situation. 
Hypotheses 
Social identity, or the way that identity is constructed for an individual with respect to 
their status as a member of a group, is useful in understanding the language attitudes that are 
currently being found in Ukraine.  Based on our knowledge of the linguistic situation in Ukraine, 
we can make several hypotheses about how linguistic attitudes are changing over time.   
If the language and identity link is strong in Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine, we 
should see that language use is connected to other perceived characteristics. In this way, we can 
expect that the group of Russian speakers in Ukraine expect for Ukrainian speakers to share a 
perceived set of group characteristics, and people who share those characteristics may choose to 
speak Ukrainian.  Similarly, native speakers of Ukrainian who feel that they have certain 
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characteristics may choose to speak Russian instead of Ukrainian, and those that speak Russian 
may be perceived to share certain characteristics. 
Although many of the negative attitudes and stereotypes toward Ukrainian no longer have 
a basis in reality, social identity theory allows us to understand some of the motivation behind 
these feelings.  Russian speakers in Ukraine have found themselves to be a marginalized group, 
as Ukrainian has gained and maintained status for all official uses.  As a result, the identity of 
Russian speakers as it pertains to the group should be felt more strongly, and perhaps the desire 
to alienate those from outside groups (i.e., Ukrainian speakers) will become more important in 
order to maintain a positive group identity.  The stereotypes about Ukrainian and Ukrainian 
speakers have been widely felt for centuries; we expect that the elevation of the status of 
Ukrainian to the official language, rather than eradicating these stereotypes, has just provided 
Russian speakers with a stronger need to propagate them. 
The ties between the members of the language group, if they reflect those in other similar 
multilingual situations, will extend beyond the language or even stereotypical characteristics, but 
we expect a strong association between Russian language speakers and Russia, and an equally 
strong tie between the use of Ukrainian and Ukrainian nationalism. 
It has been nearly 20 years since Ukrainian was made the only official language of 
Ukraine, and most of today’s young adults, even in Russian-speaking regions, have been 
educated in Ukrainian and have spent much of their lives surrounded by official documents in 
Ukrainian, politicians speaking only Ukrainian, and much of the media being in Ukrainian.  
Other adults, on the other hand, experienced a sharp transition, and may not have been fully 
prepared; they have most likely faced more consequences and we therefore expect them to have 
stronger reactions toward Ukrainian.  Similarly, as Ukrainian gains in strength from west to east, 
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we expect stronger negative attitudes toward Ukrainian in the eastern areas, and more liberal 
opinions in central regions. 
 Thus, there are four hypotheses about how linguistic attitudes are changing in Ukraine:  
1) an expectation that individuals suggest that Ukrainian-speaking highlights certain 
characteristics of its speakers and that speakers of Ukrainian possess certain characteristics 
because they speak Ukrainian; 2) an expectation that some Russian speakers will perpetuate 
negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers; 3) the 
connection of language to national identity should be strongly felt; and 4) an expectation for 
different opinions based on age and geographic location.  While the majority of Ukrainians are 
proficient in both Russian and Ukrainian, the results of this study will help to highlight how 
linguistic policy change can affect the way groups of speakers see each other and themselves. 
Research Findings 
 The surveys, questionnaires, and interviews that were conducted in Ukraine covered a 
wide range of topics; in this section, analysis is done based on survey questions related to 
language and identity.  Specifically, we will be analyzing questions relating to basis of self-
identification and linguistic attitudes, and the correlations between those factors.   
Basis of self-identification 
 Sweeping changes have happened in Ukraine since its independence in 1991.  While 
Soviet citizens were encouraged to think of themselves as part of a unified system, and thus 
Soviets above all, the question of nationality was relatively straight-forward:  everybody over the 
age of 16 had a passport, and in that passport was the person’s nationality, based on ethnicity.  
After 1991, however, the Ukrainian national passport had no such distinction, and the question of 
nationality was less official.  Thus, there are three main ways in which Ukrainians may currently 
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identify their nationality:  based on their citizenship, their ethnicity, and their language.  As we 
examine the way that Ukrainians identify themselves, one of the most basic and important 
questions is where the sense of national identity comes from.  We have seen that in a bilingual 
society, language often plays a large role in self-identification; the following data illustrate how 
recipients responded to questions about where their feelings of national identity come from. 
 Table 1.1 shows all 101 respondents’ answers nationwide to the questions, “How strongly 
is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?” and 
“How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which nationality is listed in 
your passport?” 
Table 1.1 Overall basis of self-identity (percent) 
 How strongly is your internal feeling and 
self-identity connected to which language 
you speak better? 
How strongly is your internal feeling and 
self-identity connected to which nationality 
is listed in your passport? 
Region Strongly 
connected 
Relatively 
connected 
Not 
connected 
Other Strongly 
connected 
Relatively 
connected 
Not 
connected 
Other 
Ukraine 19.8 31.7 46.5 0.0 11.9 26.7 59.4 1.0 
 
Table 1.2 illustrates the 101 respondents’ answers to the question “How strongly is your internal 
feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?” 
Table 1.2  Overall basis of self-identity (percent) 
 How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you 
live in Ukraine? 
Region Strongly connected Relatively connected Not connected Other 
Ukraine 22.8 37.6 35.6 3.0 
 
 From these tables, we can see that more people connect their internal feeling with their 
geographical location than which language they speak more fluently, and fewer people connect 
their self-identity with the passport.  When we break up the data by region, age, and gender, 
trends can be established. 
 Table 1.3 looks at the basis of self-identity based on the questions “How strongly is your 
internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?” and “How 
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strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?” 
broken down by region. The question regarding passport information did not illustrate any clear 
differences when compared between the respondents from different regions.  
Table 1.3:  Basis of self-identity by region (percent) 
 How strongly is your internal 
feeling and self-identity connected 
to which language you speak better? 
How strongly is your internal feeling and self-
identity connected to the fact that you live in 
Ukraine? 
Region Strongly 
connected 
Relatively 
connected 
Not 
connected 
Strongly 
connected 
Relatively 
connected 
Not 
connected 
Other 
Kherson 26.7 30.0 43.3 23.3 40.0 36.7 0.0 
Kyiv 11.5 30.8 53.8 38.5 50.0 7.7 3.8 
Kharkov 24.2 27.3 45.5 15.2 24.2 54.5 3.0 
Simferopol 8.3 50.0 41.7 8.3 41.7 41.7 8.3 
  
Looking at the information by region, we see that those in the highly concentrated 
Russian-speaking areas are much more likely to connect their self-identity to the Russian 
language, whereas in Kyiv, internal feelings of self-identity are much more likely to be 
connected to the fact that they live in Ukraine.  Kherson citizens, while likely to connect their 
self-identity to their native Russian, also report connections to their geography in greater 
numbers than those from Kharkov or Simferopol.   
 The breakdown of these questions by age is critical to understanding the changes that are 
happening within Ukraine.  As we saw in the research hypotheses, it is my contention that a shift 
is happening, wherein people within the Soviet Union primarily identified themselves based on 
language, but now, there is an upsurge in patriotism and a connection is being made between the 
Ukrainian language and national pride; thus, looking at the following questions by age perhaps 
allows us to understand the mechanism for changing attitudes of Russian speakers toward 
Ukrainian and its speakers.  Table 1.4 looks at the answers to the questions “How strongly is 
your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?” and “How 
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strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?” 
broken down by age group. 
Table 1.4  Basis of self-identity by age (percent) 
 How strongly is your internal feeling and 
self-identity connected to which language 
you speak better? 
How strongly is your internal feeling and 
self-identity connected to the fact that you 
live in Ukraine? 
Age 
group 
Strongly 
connected 
Relatively 
connected 
Not 
connected 
Strongly 
connected 
Relatively 
connected 
Not 
connected 
Other 
18-35 14.8 31.5 51.9 12.6 50.0 31.5 3.7 
45-80 25.7 31.4 40.0 34.3 22.9 42.9 0.0 
 
 When comparing these charts, we see that the younger generation is more likely to 
connect self-identity with living in Ukraine, while the older generation is more likely to connect 
self-identity to language.   
 Although gender can be an important factor in self-identification, the breakdown of the 
data according to gender in these questions, as well as for the majority of the data, did not reveal 
any noticeable differences.  For the rest of the study, gender will only be discussed when the 
responses illustrate a clear difference between the genders.   
 To sum up, there are a variety of ways that Ukrainians currently identify themselves, with 
the two most important characteristics being language and geography.  The respondents of these 
questionnaires were all native Russian speakers, and all lived in Ukraine.  However, some of the 
respondents felt a stronger connection to their native Russian than the fact that they live in 
Ukraine, while others strongly connected their identity to their geographic location.  Generally 
speaking, those in areas with a high concentration of Russian speakers and older respondents 
were more likely to identify based on their native Russian, while those in Kyiv and younger 
respondents were more likely to identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine. 
Self-identification 
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Because self-identification may be based on a number of factors in Ukraine, it was 
critical for the survey to be designed in a way that would make it possible to understand not 
simply the way that people identify based on their own internal feelings, but also the way they 
identify themselves to others, showing a complex picture of identity formation from above and 
within, at the collective and individual level.  As we have seen in this paper, identity is incredibly 
complicated, and understanding the way that people identify themselves both internally and 
externally, officially and unofficially, will help us to understand how these factors interact and 
create a sense of identity. 
The first question to ask, then, is how people identify themselves – as Russian, Ukrainian, 
or other.  Table 1.5 illustrates the answers of all 101 respondents throughout Ukraine to the 
questions “When people ask, ‘who are you?’ whom do you identify yourself as?” and “How do 
you feel internally?”   
Table 1.5  Overall national identity (percent) 
 When people ask, “who are you?” 
whom do you identify yourself as? 
How do you feel internally? 
Region Russian Ukrainian Other Russian Ukrainian Russian and 
Ukrainian 
Other 
Ukraine 17.8 70.3 9.9 18.8 43.6 32.7 5.0 
 
Table 1.6 gives the answer from all 101 respondents in the study to the question, “In the years 
after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?” 
Table 1.6  Overall change in internal feelings (percent) 
 In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change? 
Region I felt more strongly 
Russian 
I felt more strongly 
Ukrainian 
I began to wonder more about 
who I am in this country 
No 
Ukraine 4.0 24.8 23.8 37.6 
 
Based on these findings, the majority of people identify as Ukrainian when asked, but nearly a 
third feel internally that they are both Russian and Ukrainian.  Nearly half of the participants 
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stated that their identification did not change after the fall of the Soviet Union, but approximately 
25% felt more strongly Ukrainian, and another 25% began to wonder more about their place in 
the newly independent country. 
 The overall information can give us an idea of the big picture in terms of self-identity on 
a national level, but one of the most important breakdowns in terms of the data is the way that 
perceptions of identity differ geographically.  Table 1.7 illustrates the responses to the questions, 
“When people ask, ‘who are you?’ whom do you identify yourself as?” and “How do you feel 
internally?” separated by region. 
Table 1.7  National identity by region (percent) 
 When people ask, “who are you?” 
whom do you identify yourself as? 
How do you feel internally? 
Region Russian Ukrainian Other Russian Ukrainian Russian and 
Ukrainian 
Other 
Kherson 10.0 86.7 3.3 13.3 53.3 30.0 3.3 
Kyiv 7.7 73.1 19.2 7.7 57.7 26.9 7.7 
Kharkov 30.3 63.7 6.1 30.3 27.3 39.4 3.0 
Simferopol 33.3 41.7 25.0 25.0 33.3 33.3 8.3 
 
Table 1.8 shows the answer to the question, “In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your 
internal feelings change?”, broken down by region. 
Table 1.8  Regional change in internal feeling (percent) 
 In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change? 
Region I felt more 
strongly Russian 
I felt more strongly 
Ukrainian 
I began to wonder more about 
who I am in this country 
No 
Kherson 3.3 16.7 33.3 43.3 
Kyiv 7.7 38.5 19.2 26.9 
Kharkov 3.0 21.2 18.2 42.4 
Simferopol 0.0 25.0 25.0 33.3 
 
In this data, we can see some interesting trends shaping up.  First, those who are in the 
highly-concentrated Russian speaking areas are more likely to identify as Russian than those in 
Kyiv and Kherson.  These trends are true both for how people identify themselves when asked 
by outsiders, and in terms of internal identification.  Approximately the same percentage of 
people identify themselves as both Russian and Ukrainian in all four regions.       
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Of all of the regions, those from Kyiv are most likely to feel more strongly Ukrainian 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, with few people from any region expressing a stronger feeling 
of Russian identity.  Those in Kherson were most likely to wonder about their place in the 
country, with approximately 1/3 of the Kherson respondents choosing this answer.  For all of the 
regions except Kyiv, the majority of the respondents answered that their self-identification had 
not changed since independence. 
It is also important to look at the way that the data breaks down by age.  Many of the 
respondents never held a Soviet passport; some of them have never known anything other than 
Ukrainian as the official language.  Looking at the data by age will help us to understand if and 
how the situation is changing.  Table 1.9 gives the responses to the questions, “When people ask, 
‘who are you?’ whom do you identify yourself as?” and “How do you feel internally?”, broken 
down by age: 
Table 1.9  National identity by age (percent) 
 When people ask, “who are you?” 
whom do you identify yourself as? 
How do you feel internally? 
Age 
group 
Russian Ukrainian Other Russian Ukrainian Russian and 
Ukrainian 
Other 
18-35 11.1 77.8 11.1 20.4 44.4 29.6 5.6 
45-80 28.6 65.7 5.7 14.3 45.7 40.0 0.0 
 
Table 1.10 illustrates the answer to the question “In the years after Ukrainian independence, did 
your internal feelings change?”, broken down by age group: 
Table 1.10  Change in internal feelings by age (percent) 
 In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change? 
Age 
group 
I felt more strongly 
Russian 
I felt more strongly 
Ukrainian 
I began to wonder more about 
who I am in this country 
No 
18-35 1.9 20.4 20.4 38.9 
45-80 5.7 28.6 22.9 42.9 
 
In this data, younger people are much more likely to identify themselves as Ukrainian 
than older people, and older people are more likely to identify themselves as Russian than 
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younger people.  However, when it comes to how the respondents feel internally, many young 
people still feel that they are Russian, and the older generation is more likely to feel both Russian 
and Ukrainian.  Similarly, it was the older generation that felt more strongly Ukrainian after 
Ukrainian independence.   
Linguistic attitudes 
 Everything that we have seen in this paper about the correlations between identity and 
social attitudes and stereotypes would suggest that, for those Russian speakers who connect their 
identity to language, negative attitudes toward Ukrainian would permeate the population, and for 
those who connect their identity to geography, more positive attitudes toward Ukrainian would 
appear. 
 Table 1.11 illustrates the respondents’ opinion about the Ukrainian language.  This was 
solicited by two different questions:  “What is your opinion on Ukrainian?” and “When you hear 
Ukrainian, it seems:” with the options of “sounds pretty,” “melodic,” “sounds ugly,” and “rude.”  
Since multiple answers were possible, the numbers may add up to over 100%. 
Table 1.11  Overall linguistic attitudes (percent) 
 What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: 
 
 
Region 
It’s a 
dialect 
of 
Russian 
It is its 
own 
language 
It’s a language that 
lost a lot during the 
years under Soviet 
rule and came back 
as a mixture of 
Russian and 
Ukrainian 
Other Sounds 
pretty 
Melodic Sounds 
ugly 
Rude 
Ukraine 5.0 66.3 18.8 8.9 62.4 21.8 7.9 8.9 
 
Table 1.12 gives the answers to the question “When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:” collapsed 
into positive and negative responses (“sounds pretty” and “melodic” are considered positive, 
“sounds ugly” and “rude” are considered negative). 
Table 1.12  Overall impression of Ukrainian (percent) 
 When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: 
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Region Positive Negative 
Ukraine 84.2 16.8 
 
 As we can see, throughout Ukraine, people generally believe that Ukrainian is its own 
language, and are much more likely to have positive associations with the sounds of the 
Ukrainian language than negative associations.  This is not necessarily true for all subsets of 
society, however; breaking down the data by geography, age, and basis of self-identity will show 
a more complex picture. 
Table 1.13 shows the answers to the questions, “What is your opinion on Ukrainian?” and 
“When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:” broken down by region. 
Table 1.13:  Language attitudes by region (percent): 
 What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: 
Region It’s a 
dialect 
of 
Russian 
It is its 
own 
language 
It’s a language that 
lost a lot during the 
years under Soviet 
rule and came back as 
a mixture of Russian 
and Ukrainian 
Other Sounds 
pretty 
Melodic Sounds 
ugly 
Rude 
Kherson 3.3 63.3 33.3 0.0 40.0 30.0 13.3 20.0 
Kyiv 3.8 84.6 7.7 3.8 88.5 15.4 3.8 0.0 
Kharkov 9.1 48.5 18.2 21.2 63.6 18.2 6.1 6.1 
Simferopol 0.0 83.3 8.3 8.3 58.3 25.0 8.3 8.3 
 
Table 1.14 gives the answers to the question “When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:” collapsed 
into positive and negative responses (“sounds pretty” and “melodic” are considered positive, 
“sounds ugly” and “rude” are considered negative). 
Table 1.14  Regional impressions of Ukrainian (percent) 
 When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: 
 Positive Negative 
Kherson 70.0 33.3 
Kyiv 103.9 3.8 
Kharkov 81.8 12.2 
Simferopol 83.3 16.6 
  
Not surprisingly, those in Kyiv were more likely to answer that Ukrainian is its own 
language, and that it is phonetically beautiful; Kyivans were more likely to have positive feelings 
about Ukrainian in general.  Those from Kherson were also likely to see Ukrainian as its own 
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language, but had a more negative impression of Ukrainian than the respondents from any of the 
other cities.  Simferopol respondents had generally positive attitudes toward Ukrainian; those 
from Kharkov were the least likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, but had generally 
positive feelings about the way Ukrainian sounds.   
 Looking at language attitudes by age will help us to fully understand the way that 
linguistic attitudes are changing over time, and with different levels of experience.  Table 1.15 
shows the answers to the above questions broken down by age group. 
Table 1.15  Language attitudes by age (percent) 
 What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it 
seems: 
Age 
group 
It’s a 
dialect 
of 
Russian 
It is its 
own 
language 
It’s a language that lost 
a lot during the years 
under Soviet rule and 
came back as a mixture 
between Russian and 
Ukrainian 
Other Sounds 
pretty 
Melodic Sounds 
ugly 
Rude 
18-35 1.9 72.2 18.5 5.6 72.2 20.4 9.3 0.0 
45-80 8.6 51.4 22.9 17.1 42.9 25.7 8.6 22.9 
 
Table 1.15 shows that the younger age bracket is more likely to see Ukrainian as its own 
language, whereas those respondents aged 45-80 are more likely to see Ukrainian as something 
else, whether it is a dialect of Russian, a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, or “other.” 
Table 1.16 collapses the answer to the above question into positive and negative 
responses (“sounds pretty” and “melodic” are considered positive, “sounds ugly” and “rude” are 
considered negative). 
Table 1.16 Impressions of Ukrainian by age (percent) 
 When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: 
Age group Positive Negative 
18-35 92.6 9.3 
45-80 68.6 31.5 
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In this table, it is clear that the younger age group has more positive impressions about 
Ukrainian, whereas the older age group is more likely to report negative impressions of 
Ukrainian. 
 In Table 1.17, the data is examined based on self-identification; the first group is those 
that strongly identify based on the language that they speak best, and the second group is made 
up of those that strongly self-identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine; the table shows 
the answers to the questions “What is your opinion on Ukrainian?” and “When you hear 
Ukrainian, it seems:”. 
Figure 1.17:  Language attitudes by self-identification (percent): 
 What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it 
seems: 
Basis of 
self-
identity 
It’s a 
dialect 
of 
Russian 
It is its 
own 
language 
It’s a language that 
lost a lot during the 
years under Soviet 
rule and came back 
as a mixture of 
Russian and 
Ukrainian 
Other Sounds 
pretty 
Melodic Sounds 
ugly 
Rude 
Language 20.0 55.0 15.0 10.0 55.0 
 
35.0 5.0 10.0 
Geography 0.0 82.6 17.4 0.0 73.9 30.4 0.0 8.7 
 
In Table 1.17, we see that those who define themselves by geography are much more likely to 
consider Ukrainian to be its own language, whereas those who identify themselves based on their 
native language are more likely to consider Ukrainian something other than its own language. 
 Table 1.18 combines the answers to the question on the perception of Ukrainian by the 
above two groups of respondents. 
Table 1.18  Impressions of Ukrainian by self-identification (percent) 
 When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: 
Basis of 
self-identity 
Positive Negative 
Language 90 15 
Geography 104.3 8.7 
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In Table 1.18, it is clear that those that identify primarily by geography are slightly more likely 
to have positive feelings about Ukrainian than those who identify primarily by language, who are 
more likely to have negative impressions of Ukrainian.  
 In sum, the data from this section illustrate that there is a correlation between linguistic 
attitudes, geographic region, age group, and basis of self-identity.  Those that are from Kyiv and 
in the younger age group are much more likely to view Ukrainian positively; similarly, those that 
identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are much more likely to have 
positive perceptions about Ukrainian and those that speak it.  Conversely, those that are in highly 
Russian speaking regions, older respondents, and those that identify themselves based on their 
native Russian language are much more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Ukrainian and its 
speakers. 
Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers 
The final category that will be examined in this paper is that of language attitudes and 
stereotypes.  Table 1.19 looks at the respondents’ answers to the questions “Do you know any 
stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?” and, of those who responded yes, “Do you 
believe these stereotypes?” 
Table 1.19  Overall stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers (percent): 
 Do you know any stereotypes about people who 
speak only Ukrainian? 
Do you believe these stereotypes? 
Region Yes No Yes No 
Ukraine 27.7 62.4 42.9 46.4 
 
As we can see in the above table, a large percentage of people throughout Ukraine have 
responded that they do not know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian; 
however, of those who know of stereotypes, roughly half of the respondents believe in them. 
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 Table 1.20 shows the respondents’ answers to the question, “Do you know any 
stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you 
believe these stereotypes?” 
Table 1.20  Overall stereotypes about Russian speakers (percent) 
 Do you know any stereotypes about 
people who speak only Russian? 
Do you believe these stereotypes? 
Region Yes No Yes No 
Ukraine 16.8 73.3 41.2 52.9 
 
The table above shows that many fewer people admit to knowing stereotypes about Russian 
speakers than not, and fewer than half of those who know these stereotypes believe in them. 
 As with the previous sections, the overall data is important to understand, but breaking it 
down amongst various demographics will help us to fully understand the contemporary linguistic 
situation in Ukraine.  Table 1.21 shows the answers to the questions, “Do you know any 
stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you 
believe these stereotypes?” broken down by region. 
Table 1.21:  Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by region (percent): 
 Do you know any stereotypes about people 
who speak only Ukrainian? 
Do you believe these stereotypes? 
Region Yes No Yes No 
Kherson 40.0 53.3 58.3 41.7 
Kyiv 23.1 76.9 66.7 16.7 
Kharkov 21.2 60.6 42.9 42.9 
Simferopol 25.0 58.3 33.3 33.3 
 
As seen in the table above, respondents from Kyiv are less likely to know stereotypes about 
Ukrainian speakers, but of those who know of stereotypes, they are the most likely to believe in 
the stereotypes.  Those from Kherson are most likely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian 
speakers, and fairly likely to believe in them.  Kharkov and Simferopol respondents were 
approximately equally unlikely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and were 
neither likely nor unlikely to believe in the stereotypes. 
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 Table 1.22 shows the responses to the questions, “Do you know any stereotypes about 
people who speak only Russian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you believe these 
stereotypes?” broken down by region. 
Table 1.22  Stereotypes about Russian speakers by region (percent) 
 Do you know any stereotypes about 
people who speak only Russian? 
Do you believe these stereotypes? 
Region Yes No Yes No 
Kherson 16.7 76.7 80.0 20.0 
Kyiv 19.2 80.8 0.0 80.0 
Kharkov 15.2 63.6 20.0 60.0 
Simferopol 16.7 66.7 100.0 0.0 
 
As is seen in the table above, respondents from all four regions were approximately equally 
likely to admit to knowing stereotypes about Russian speakers (or, more accurately, admit to not 
knowing such stereotypes), but those from Kherson and Simferopol were much more likely to 
believe these stereotypes than those from Kyiv and Kharkov. 
Table 1.23 shows the answers to the questions, “Do you know any stereotypes about 
people who speak only Ukrainian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you believe these 
stereotypes?” broken down by age group.  
Table 1.23  Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by age (percent) 
 Do you know any stereotypes about people 
who speak only Ukrainian? 
Do you believe these stereotypes? 
Age group Yes No Yes No 
18-35 24.1 63.0 46.2 53.8 
45-80 34.3 60.0 41.7 41.7 
 
As seen in the table above, older respondents were more likely to admit to knowing stereotypes 
about Ukrainian speakers, and were equally split as to whether they believe in the stereotypes or 
not; younger respondents were less likely to know stereotypes, and were less likely to believe in 
them. 
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 Table 1.24 shows the responses to the questions, “Do you know any stereotypes about 
people who speak only Russian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you believe these 
stereotypes?” broken down by age. 
Table 1.24  Stereotypes about Russian speakers by age (percent) 
 Do you know any stereotypes about people 
who speak only Russian? 
Do you believe these stereotypes? 
Age group Yes No Yes No 
18-35 20.4 70.4 45.5 45.5 
45-80 11.4 77.1 25.0 50.0 
 
 In these charts, we can see that young people are both more likely to know stereotypes 
about Russian speakers than older people are, and they are considerably more likely to believe 
them. 
While the majority of the respondents overall did not have knowledge of stereotypes 
about Ukrainian speakers or Russian speakers, when respondents were asked to indicate 
attributes that they felt Ukrainian-only speakers had, the answers were quite different.  For this 
question, respondents were given the option of marking multiple options; specific stereotypes 
were provided.  A few individual respondents marked every answer, and a few left the answer 
blank, but the majority marked either positive or negative stereotypes.  Table 1.25 gives all the 
respondents’ answer to the question, “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian 
and don’t speak Russian?  Multiple answers possible.”  
Table 1.25  Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Region Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual 
Ukraine 5.0 5.0 22.8 53.5 33.7 22.8 12.9 
 
Table 1.26 combines the negative answers to the above question (illiterate, uncultured, simple) 
and positive answers (literate, cultured, intellectual) combined.  Nationalistic could be seen as 
either positive or negative, so it remains separate. 
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Table 1.26  Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Region Negative Nationalistic Positive 
Ukraine 32.8 53.5 69.4 
 
Overall, more respondents feel positively about people who only speak Ukrainian than 
negatively, and a significant percentage of respondents believe that those who speak Ukrainian 
and not Russian are nationalistic. 
 Table 1.27 illustrates the answers to the question, “What do you think about people who 
speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  Multiple answers possible,” broken down by 
region. 
Table 1.27  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Region Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual 
Kherson 3.3 0.0 30.0 50.0 36.7 16.7 10.0 
Kyiv 11.5 11.5 11.5 50.0 50.0 30.8 34.6 
Kharkov 3.0 6.1 30.0 54.5 21.2 21.2 6.1 
Simferopol 0.0 0.0 8.3 75.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 
 
Table 1.28 combines the answers given in Table 1.27, with “illiterate,” “uncultured,” and 
“simple” considered negative responses, “literate,” “cultured,” and “intellectual,” considered 
positive responses, and “nationalistic” left as its own category, as it could be considered either 
negative or positive. 
Table 1.28  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Region Negative Nationalistic Positive 
Kherson 33.3 50.0 63.4 
Kyiv 34.5 50.0 115.4 
Kharkov 39.1 54.5 48.5 
Simferopol 8.3 75.0 50 
 
Table 1.28 shows that respondents from Kyiv have much stronger positive feelings about those 
who speak Ukrainian than respondents from the other regions, which have are nearly equal in 
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their responses, although those from Kherson are slightly more likely to feel positively about 
those who speak only Ukrainian.  Simferopol respondents are the least likely to report negative 
characteristics that they attribute to Ukrainian speakers, with the other three regions being 
relatively similar.  Those in Simferopol are also more likely than respondents from other regions 
to report that they believe Ukrainian speakers are nationalistic respondents from the other three 
regions. 
 Table 1.29 gives the answers to the question “What do you think about people who speak 
only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible,” broken down between age 
groups. 
Table 1.29  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Age 
group 
Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual 
18-35 1.9 3.7 29.6 55.6 37.0 40.7 18.5 
45-80 11.4 8.6 17.1 48.6 28.6 8.6 5.7 
 
Table 1.30 combines the answers given in Table 1.29, with “illiterate,” “uncultured,” and 
“simple” considered negative responses, “literate,” “cultured,” and “intellectual,” considered 
positive responses, and “nationalistic” left as its own category, as it could be considered either 
negative or positive. 
Table 1.30  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Age 
group 
Negative Nationalistic Positive 
18-35 35.2 55.6 96.2 
45-80 37.1 48.6 42.9 
 
As we can see in Table 1.30, approximately the same amount of younger as older respondents 
attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, and there is very little difference in the 
percentage of respondents who consider Ukrainian speakers to be nationalistic; however, those 
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who are between 18-35 are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian 
speakers than those who are 45-80 years of age. 
 As with previous sections, language attitudes when broken down by gender show no 
noticeable difference in most of the questions.  However, there was a difference in the answers to 
the question, “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak 
Russian?”  Table 1.31 shows the answers to this question, split between male and female 
respondents. 
Table 1.31  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Gender Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual 
Male 5.7 0.0 25.7 48.6 31.4 25.7 11.4 
Female 4.5 7.6 21.2 56.1 34.8 21.2 38.5 
 
Table 1.32 collapses the data in Table 1.31 between positive responses, negative responses, and 
“nationalistic,” which can be considered either positive or negative. 
Table 1.32  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Gender Negative Nationalistic Positive 
Male 31.4 48.6 68.5 
Female 33.3 56.1 94.5 
 
Table 1.32 shows that, while men and women are equally likely to attribute negative 
characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, women are much more likely to attribute positive 
characteristics than men are, and slightly more likely to believe that Ukrainian-only speakers are 
nationalistic. 
 Table 1.33 shows the answer to the question, “What do you think about people who 
speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  Multiple answers possible,” broken down by 
basis of self-identification. 
Table 1.33  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
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 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?  
Multiple answers possible 
Basis of 
self-identity 
Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual 
Language 10.0 20.0 30.0 75.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 
Geography 0.0 0.0 26.1 39.1 52.2 30.4 26.1 
 
As is seen in Table 1.33, each of the first three categories (negative responses) is more widely 
believed by those who identify themselves based on their native Russian language, and each of 
the last three categories (positive responses) is more widely believed by those who identify 
themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine. 
 Table 1.34 collapses the data from Table 1.33 into negative and positive responses, along 
with “nationalistic,” which can be considered either positive or negative. 
Table 1.34  Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) 
 What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak 
Russian?  Multiple answers possible 
Basis of self-
identity 
Negative Nationalistic Positive 
Language 60.0 75.0 60.0 
Geography 26.1 39.1 108.7 
 
Table 1.34 shows that those who identify primarily based on geography are much more likely to 
attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, while those who identify themselves 
primarily based on their native Russian language are much more likely to attribute negative 
characteristics to Ukrainian speakers.  There is also a large difference in the number of 
respondents who view Ukrainian-only speakers as nationalistic; those who identify themselves 
primarily based on language are much more likely to see Ukrainian speakers as nationalistic. 
To summarize, while most respondents did not claim to know stereotypes about those 
who spoke only Russian or Ukrainian, when given possible stereotypes to choose from, we were 
able to see specific trends with regards to attitudes about Ukrainian and its speakers.  
Specifically, those from Kyiv, younger respondents, women, and those who connected their self-
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identity to the fact that they live in Ukraine were far more likely to hold positive views of 
Ukrainian and its speakers than their counterparts; negative responses were much more equally 
distributed.  Across the board, the idea of a pure language was held up as a higher standard than 
any mixtures between Russian and Ukrainian.  
General Discussion 
Identity is comprised of many factors, and is constantly being negotiated.  According to 
the social identity theory, one of the most critical ways that individuals define themselves is by 
the group that they are a part of, as well as by the group of which they are not a part.  In Ukraine, 
many of the people generally share the same religion, the same general ethnic background, and 
the same cultural customs.  However, there is one marker that separates the country into two very 
distinct groups:  language.  Although most Ukrainians are bilingual, the mother tongue of a 
region has come to symbolize not simply the preferred method of communication, but it also 
brings to mind the politics of the region, as well as many of the perceived characteristics of the 
speakers.  This paper, and the survey questions analyzed, help to show us how identity and 
language interact in Ukraine, how various linguistic attitudes are playing out throughout the 
country, and how it is reflected on different groups of people.  In this section, we will discuss the 
implications of the research, as it pertains to the changing basis of identity in Ukraine, and the 
implications such identification has for the different groups within the country, including 
linguistic attitudes and stereotypes. 
Basis of self-identity: 
 One of the most important factors in understanding the current linguistic situation in 
Ukraine is the basis of self-identification.  Because of several reasons, the basis of self-identity in 
Ukraine is complicated.  National identity under Soviet rule was dictated from above in the form 
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of a passport feature; on the other hand, language has been shown to be closely tied to national 
identity, and since independence, there has been an upswing in nationalism tied to the idea of 
living in Ukraine.  Thus, understanding how and why people are identifying helps to explain all 
other connections between language attitudes and identity. 
The findings reported in this paper show that overall, in Ukraine, there is a tendency for 
people to connect their own self-identification with the fact that they live in Ukraine, rather than 
their native tongue or their passport status.  This gives us a good impression of the current 
situation, as Ukrainian national pride has been strongly supported, especially since the Orange 
Revolution of 2004, and where nationality has not been marked in passports since the fall of the 
Soviet Union.  As the majority of respondents did not feel a connection between self-
identification and the nationality listed in their passport, language and connection to Ukraine are 
the most critical factors in identity formation and negotiation in Ukraine today. 
 Taking this into account, different demographic groups base their self-identity on these 
two factors (language and geography) in different ways.  As we have seen earlier in the paper, 
identity is complex, negotiable, and fluid; hence, these factors vary amongst individuals and 
throughout different groups.  In Ukraine, the two clearest demographic indicators that affect how 
individuals form and negotiate their identity are age and region within Ukraine. 
 Generational differences are seen throughout the world, and it is no surprise that they 
come into play in Ukraine, where the social, economic, and political world has changed 
enormously over the past thirty years:  the younger generation is in an entirely different country 
than the one in which the older generation came of age.  As Padilla and Perez pointed out, social 
identity theory tells us that an individual’s behavior reflects their society.  The society of the 
youth today is vastly different than that in which the older generation formed their identities. 
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 One of the key components of social identity theory is that individuals play up the 
characteristics of their social group while viewing out-group members in a more negative light in 
order to build their own self-esteem and gain a strong sense of identity.  For the youth in 
Ukraine, the defining groups have shifted significantly.  In the Soviet Union, at least in theory, 
all members of the Soviet Union were part of one large group, and the use of the Russian 
language helped to cement the ties of this group, as did the out-group comparisons to the west 
during the Cold War.  Soviet citizens were able to form their identity against those who were 
different; at least one aspect that could be used to determine outsiders from insiders was 
language.  In this way, the older generation in Ukraine had a vested interest in building their 
identity based on their language, and perpetrating negative stereotypes about those who spoke 
differently (in this case, those who spoke Ukrainian). 
 On the other hand, the younger generation is part of an entirely different social group.  
Ukraine as a country has long been associated with Russia, all the way back to Kyivan Rus’, and 
the independence of the country requires a symbolic separation from Russia.  The younger 
generation, thus, has a new social group which defines itself in opposition to Russia.  The 
younger generation has a strong incentive to build their identity based on their geographic 
location rather than language:  their geographic location allows them to be a part of a strong, 
nationalistic, independent Ukraine, whereas basing their identity on their native Russian 
language ties them more closely to the outgroup, Russia. 
 In both of these situations, the Ukrainians were able to maintain their uniqueness in the 
world in opposition to the outgroup, while supporting a sense of belonging to their ingroup.  
Thus, the changing basis of identity for these groups is not simply an individual phenomenon, 
but instead, a reflection of the vast changes that have occurred in the country. 
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 In a similar way, geographic location within the country has a large impact on the way 
that individuals form and negotiate their identity.  In some parts of Ukraine, such as Simferopol 
and Kharkov, the ties to Russia are still very strong, with many citizens having relatives in 
Russia and with frequent travel back and forth to Russia.  Because of this, the ingroup for many 
in those regions is actually not Ukraine, but Russia.  For the same reasons as seen above, these 
individuals have a strong incentive to identify therefore on the basis of their language, which 
they share with their neighbors to the east, as opposed to the fact that they live in Ukraine, which 
alienates them from the other members of their ingroup.  In Kyiv, however, the political center is 
built on Ukrainian independence, and all official business is centered on Ukraine.  Thus, the 
citizens in Kyiv have a stronger interest in forming identity based on the fact that they live in 
Ukraine, which ties them to Ukrainians, as opposed to their native Russian, which ties them to 
their particular outgroup (Russia).   
 Looking at the negotiation of identity for different demographic groups in Ukraine helps 
to paint a bigger picture about how the social, economic, and political situation is affecting 
individuals.  Identity negotiation and formation for different age groups suggests that there is a 
large shift occurring in the country over the course of time, with the ingroup of the younger 
generation being tied to the newly independent country and opposed to Russia, whereas the older 
generation’s social group was tied to the rest of the Soviet Union.  Likewise, geographically, we 
can see a change sweeping across the nation from west to east, with the more western and central 
regions connecting themselves to the newly independent country, and the eastern regions being 
part of an ingroup that is connected to Russia.   
Once it is clear what social group a certain demographic is likely to align themselves 
with, the identity formation and negotiation falls into place as expected by social identity theory, 
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and the positive and negative attitudes that arise about the Ukrainian language and its speakers 
are exactly what we might expect:  those who see themselves first and foremost as part of the 
independent, strong, nationalistic Ukraine perpetrate positive stereotypes and attitudes, and those 
who connect themselves to Russia are much more likely to view those who speak Ukrainian as 
members of an outgroup, and to hold negative viewpoints accordingly. 
Self-Identity 
 Now that we understand why people are identifying themselves in the way that they do, it 
is useful to take a closer look at how people identify, in terms of nationality.  Throughout the 
nation, respondents were overwhelmingly more likely to identify themselves to others as 
Ukrainian, whereas internally, there is a lot more room to negotiate, with respondents splitting 
their answers between Ukrainian, Russian, and Ukrainian and Russian. 
As we have seen earlier in the paper, a multilingual setting allows for and even 
encourages a somewhat fluid sense of identity.  Gade’s 2003 study showed that the “scriptoral 
landscape” in a multilingual setting keeps language in the public consciousness, and this is 
absolutely true in Ukraine today, especially in regions with a Russian-speaking majority.  While 
day-to-day business, family life, conversations between friends, and nearly all other personal 
interactions take place in Russian, the written environment, by law, is nearly completely 
Ukrainian, and the media is some of each, with many television channels showing Russian 
programs with Ukrainian subtitles.  Because of this, it is always in the forefront of many native 
Russian speakers’ minds that they are on one hand Ukrainian and therefore connected to the 
country, and on the other hand alienated somewhat from the official discourse. 
This kind of fluid self-identity is seen especially amongst demographic groups that are 
caught between two worlds.  Identity is being imposed on all Ukrainians from above, connecting 
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language and nationalism, and providing many with a strong incentive to identify as Ukrainian 
first and foremost.  It is also felt by native Russian speakers from below, providing an incentive 
to identify as Russian.  Regionally speaking, Kharkov is quite close to Russia, and Simferopol 
has a very strong Russian past; while speakers from these regions certainly feel the pressure from 
above to identify as Ukrainian, their Russian identity has a solid base.  Kyiv, on the other hand, 
is the political center, and even if private discourse is in Russian, public conversations, business 
transactions, and workplaces are often Ukrainian-speaking.  In Kyiv, we saw the fewest 
respondents identifying either internally or externally as solely Russian. 
Pavlenko (2003) discusses this when she talks about negotiating identity in multilingual 
settings; in a situation where identity is truly fluid, and there are options, choice of language 
signifies an individual’s desire to belong to a group, based on certain characteristics, or to play 
up characteristics in themselves that are associated with that group.  Because of this, there is 
often a difference in the way that individuals identify themselves internally and externally.  
Externally, respondents from all regions use their Ukrainian national identification as a way to 
highlight their feelings of national pride, whereas internally, they may feel more strongly 
Russian. 
Kherson is a Russian-speaking city surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking villages.  It has 
neither a strong connection to Russia nor important political connections.  The national identity 
of those in Kherson is the most vulnerable of all of the regions.  Interestingly, Kherson’s 
respondents defined themselves to others as solely Ukrainian more than any other region, 
including Kyiv.  Internally, they also self-identified at a high level as either Ukrainian or 
Ukrainian and Russian.  This is interesting, given the history of the region as a Russian-speaking 
stronghold.  However, if we look back to the way that Smith (1991) views national identity 
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through the lens of social constructionism, it is not surprising to see respondents from Kherson 
identifying strongly as Ukrainian.  As we have seen above, their identity is in a vulnerable 
position, politically and geographically, and Smith’s “need for community” places a greater need 
on Kherson residents to find that community.  As the bases of self-identification become shaken, 
the members of the community risk more by being ambivalent about the community to which 
they belong; thus there is more pressure to adhere to specific communities.   
This vulnerability is shown in the way that respondents report changes after the fall of the 
Soviet Union.  Although a few respondents in Kyiv felt more strongly Russian, Kyivans were 
much more likely to report that they felt more strongly Ukrainian, perhaps as a result of the very 
rapid change of official business to Ukrainian.  Khersonians are the most likely of any 
respondents to feel confused about their place in the country; this is not a region with an inherent 
connection to either Russian or Ukrainian identity, so confusion is more likely here.  As noted 
above, though, this confusion indicates a vulnerable situation, and leads to more people clinging 
to the identity that is imposed from above. 
When it comes to the difference between self-identification and age groups, we see that 
younger people are more likely to identify themselves to others as Ukrainian, but when it comes 
to internal feelings, the 18-35 year olds were much more split than the older group.  Much like 
the data from Kherson, this is most likely an indication of changing times and the vulnerability 
of the youth.  They are pressured from above to feel a national pride and identify as Ukrainian, 
but geographically and linguistically, many of them feel strong connections to Russian, as well.  
Thus, social constructionist theory lets us see this in terms of what each group of respondents is 
receiving from and giving to the community; on the surface, and to outsiders, it is increasingly 
important for young people to identify as Ukrainian in order to conform to the pressure of 
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society.  However, the fluidity of identity and the importance of language and immediate social 
circles can push them in the opposite direction. 
When we look at the data about changes since the fall of the Soviet Union, there was not 
a large discrepancy between the younger and the older respondents.  Those aged 45-80 were 
more likely to feel more strongly Russian, more strongly Ukrainian, and more confused; this 
makes a lot of sense once you take into account the fact that many of the younger respondents 
had not fully formed their identity when the Soviet Union fell (the oldest members of that group 
being only 17), and therefore, they were less likely to feel any sort of change, or report on it in 
the survey.  
Summary of discussion on identity 
 As we saw earlier in the paper, identity is incredibly complicated, and involves a myriad 
of factors.  Social constructionist theory allows us to look at the way that society shapes identity 
both from above and from within, and when we look at the data from the surveys, that is 
precisely what we see happening in Ukraine.  On the surface, there are pockets of relatively 
stable identification, whether geographically, politically, or in terms of age.  Scratching below 
the surface, however, we see that certain subsets of Ukraine are becoming more vulnerable to 
questions of identity, based on pressures both from above and from within.  We have seen that 
identity in a multilingual context is constantly being negotiated, and Ukraine illustrates this point 
quite well. 
 The data shows us that, in general, those who are living in Kyiv are more pro-Ukrainian 
(both as a language and as a nation), as are those who are between the ages of 18 and 35.  We 
have also seen that those who are living in Kharkov and Simferopol, long seen as Russian 
strongholds, are more likely to identify as Russian, to connect their identity to their native 
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Russian tongue, and be less affected by the pressure from the state to feel strongly nationalistic.  
We see the same with the older group, ages 45-80.  We also see, however, that in the vulnerable 
geographic area of Kherson, identity is much more confusing and fluid; younger people, too, are 
likely to feel pulled in multiple directions.  This is likely a direct result of their changing position 
(politically, geographically, linguistically), and the need to feel connection to a group while 
maintaining strong internal feelings of identity. 
 Ukraine is rapidly changing, and the identification of the people from Ukraine reflects 
these changes and the personal disturbance that comes with such strong political and linguistic 
upheavals.  While each person in Ukraine determines their own identity and basis for that 
identity, there is pressure from the central powers to connect identification to living in Ukraine, 
and internal pressure that connects identity to language.  The results from these surveys reflect 
such pressures.  How people identify themselves is critical to the way that people interact with 
each other, and is central to the way that language attitudes play out in society. 
Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes 
In order to understand the way that language attitudes work in Ukraine, it is critical to 
look at the data keeping in mind stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes.  Goffman’s (1963) 
work on stigma helps us to understand the potential for negative attitudes between language 
groups in a multilingual situation.  As Padilla and Perez point out, the factor that is stigmatized is 
one that is, in some way, disadvantaged or having a lack of power.  In Ukraine, there are two 
ways in which power is connected to language choice currently:  economically and politically, 
and socially.   
 In Ukraine, Ukrainian is currently the language of political and economic power.  
Currently, an individual that is not fluent in Ukrainian faces a large disadvantage in the country, 
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even in regions where Russian is primarily used; court documents, post office signs, train 
schedules, and all official writing is in Ukrainian.  Further, many workplaces require Ukrainian 
fluency, such as schools, universities, and government offices.  In this sense, Russian language 
would be the language to carry stigma; the reverse of this is that Ukrainian language speakers are 
given positive attributes based solely on their language use. 
 In Ukraine, the choice of Ukrainian for the entire nation is clearly an example of 
Paulston’s (1997) territoriality principle.  As we discussed earlier, this indicates that the goals of 
the nation currently come first in Ukraine.  Because of this, the situation for native Russian 
speakers in Ukraine is in opposition to the linguistic rights laid out by UNESCO:  in many 
places, Russian is not taught (or is not taught at an equal level as Ukrainian), there is restricted 
access to cultural services, there is not equitable presence of their language and culture in 
communications media, and they cannot receive attention in their own language from 
government bodies.  This directly affects the stigma that can be felt by those who speak Russian 
natively. 
 On the other hand, Russian is, in many regions, socially more powerful than Ukrainian.  
As a gentleman in Kharkov was opting not to fill out the survey (he did not want to have 
documented proof of him speaking out about Ukrainian), he told me that Ukrainian would never 
gain a foothold in Kharkov, even if it was required in schools.  Teenagers like his daughter, he 
said, would simply refuse to talk or associate with somebody if they tried to use Ukrainian in 
conversation.  In this sense, Ukrainian can be the stigmatized factor. 
 As Kunda and Sinclair (1999) pointed out, situations such as the one above can lead 
directly to linguistic stereotypes.  Because of dissonance theory, stereotypes about Russian and 
Ukrainian may be perpetrated in order to increase the distance between the two groups, and 
Borderlanguage: Language Policy, Ideology and Identity in Ukraine Susan Vdovichenko 
P a g e  | 55 
 
 
 
because of attribution theory, positive attributes may be given to speakers of each language in 
order to increase their self-esteem.   
Because the stigma and the power vary between the two languages, there is not an 
obvious language choice for all situations.  At times, in certain regions, and in various situations, 
Ukrainian may be stigmatized; other circumstances can result in a stigmatization of Russian.  
This complicates the situation, but it helps us to understand how and why both positive and 
negative stereotypes and attributes about Ukrainian are currently found in Ukrainian society, and 
how the attitudes break down across demographics can show us more clearly the power 
differentials between the languages in different situations. 
 As in previous sections, how an individual determines their social group is critical to 
understanding the way that these stereotypes work throughout the country.  For those who are 
identifying first and foremost as Ukrainian, because they live in Ukraine, Russian is stigmatized, 
and Ukrainian is characterized by positive attributes and stereotypes.  For those who identify 
primarily as Russian, because that is their native tongue, Ukrainian is stigmatized, and negative 
stereotypes and attributes are assigned to it.  In the next two sections, we will discuss the specific 
findings with regards to language attitudes and stereotypes. 
Language attitudes 
 The overall survey results found that most people in Ukraine see Ukrainian as a separate 
language, and the vast majority of overall respondents had a positive response to the way that 
Ukrainian sounds.  Given the generally negative feelings about Ukrainian under the Soviet 
Union, this is strong evidence to the success of policies to increase the use of and positive 
attitudes toward Ukrainian.   
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It is important to note some conventional wisdom about Ukrainian, which seems to be 
known by all but hard to verify.  Something that often comes up in conversations about 
Ukrainian is the idea that Ukrainian is one of the most melodic languages in the world.  Although 
it is very often cited, it is difficult to find the source.  The following quote comes from an article 
about Ukrainian:  На конкурсі краси мов у 1934 р. у Парижі українська мова зайняла третє 
місце після французької і перської (In a contest of beautiful languages in 1934 in Paris, 
Ukrainian took third place, after French and Persian).3  However, there seems to be no trace of 
the actual contest.  Regardless, it is in the public consciousness that not only is Ukrainian a 
beautiful language, but it is internationally regarded as such.  Hence, it is not surprising that 
many respondents answered that Ukrainian sounds beautiful or melodic. 
Regionally, the responses exactly reflect what the scholarship expects.  Those from Kyiv, 
which has the strongest political and economical advantages for Ukrainian, and the weakest 
social advantages for Russian, were most likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, and are 
much more likely to have positive than negative responses to what Ukrainian sounds like.  Those 
in Kherson were also very likely to think of Ukrainian as its own language, but were the most 
likely of all the respondents to respond negatively to the sounds of Ukrainian.  Once again, the 
data from Kherson indicate something of a dichotomy, as on one hand, those from Kherson seem 
to support Ukrainian, and on the other, they have negative attitudes about it.  This is a result of 
the competing forces that are playing themselves out in Kherson. 
Those from Kharkov, which has the least economic and political power for Ukrainian and 
the most social power for Russian, are least likely to see Ukrainian as its own language and most 
likely to see it as a dialect of Russian, although they have a generally positive attitude about the 
 
3 (http://www.ukrlit.vn.ua/article/1046.html, accessed on January 11, 2010). 
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way that Ukrainian sounds - with a caveat.  In Kharkov, many respondents made sure to point 
out that standard, literary Ukrainian (such as the Ukrainian from the international competition) is 
beautiful, but that the language which is spoken in the western part of Ukraine today is not.  In 
this way, respondents were able to maintain negative beliefs about what is actually being spoken, 
while accepting the ideology of Ukrainian (in many people’s minds, this can only mean the 
literary standard language) being beautiful. 
The data from Simferopol is difficult to fully understand.  We would expect the responses 
from Simferopol to mirror those of Kharkov, which they do, in terms of the sounds of Ukrainian, 
but respondents from Simferopol were nearly as likely as Kyivans, and much more likely than 
any other regional group, to feel that Ukrainian is its own language.  This may be because of the 
small sample size from Simferopol. 
When looking at language attitudes by age, the youth are much more likely to feel that 
Ukrainian is its own language, whereas the 45-80 age group respondents were more likely to 
think of Ukrainian as something else, whether it be a dialect of Russian, a mixture between an 
older version of Ukrainian and Russian, or other.  This reflects the changing attitudes; many of 
the youngest respondents had not yet made it through the school system when most schools 
switched to Ukrainian, and therefore, are more likely to accept Ukrainian as a fully functioning, 
legitimate language; they likely connect Ukrainian to economic and political power, and, having 
been educated in Ukrainian, are less likely to feel the social pressure to always speak Russian.  
Similarly, the age group breakdown showed a significant difference in the way that respondents 
felt that Ukrainian sounds, many more of those 18-35 felt positively towards the sounds of 
Ukrainian than those between the ages of 45 and 80; conversely, very few of the younger group 
felt negatively, as opposed to nearly 1/3 of the older group.   
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 One of the most telling ways of looking at the data on language attitudes is by breaking it 
down by basis of self-identification.  As we saw earlier, respondents were asked to distinguish 
what they most strongly connected their identity with: passport status, language, or the fact that 
they lived in Ukraine.  Those who identify themselves based on their native Russian tongue are 
likely to attach a stigma to the Ukrainian language, in order to distance themselves from the 
outgroup.  On the other hand, those who identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are 
likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian, in order to boost the collective self-
esteem of the ingroup.  The data from the survey reflects just this phenomenon. 
From the data, we can see that those who strongly connect their self-identification with 
the fact that they are native Russian speakers are more likely to think of Ukrainian as a dialect of 
Russian, and have a negative view of the way it sounds, and those that connect their identity with 
the fact that they live in Ukraine are more likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, and are 
more likely to think of Ukrainian as beautiful or melodic.   
Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers 
Overall, there were more respondents that did not know any stereotypes about Ukrainian-
only speakers than those who did, and of those who did, approximately an equal number were 
likely to believe in the stereotypes as not.  Fewer people knew stereotypes about Russian-only 
speakers, and the respondents were less likely to believe the stereotypes.  Given what we know 
about the formation of stereotypes, and the fact that the respondents were all native Russian 
speakers, it is somewhat surprising to find such similar numbers when it comes to belief in 
stereotypes, although not surprising to see that many more people knew stereotypes about 
Ukrainian speakers.  Looking at the data from the point of view of specific subgroups, however, 
makes the picture much clearer. 
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Regionally, those from Kherson were the most likely to know stereotypes about 
Ukrainian speakers, while those in Kharkov were the least likely.  However, while those in Kyiv 
were unlikely to know stereotypes, they were the most likely to believe in them.  Those from 
Kharkov and Simferopol were approximately equally unlikely to know or believe in the 
stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers.  All groups were equally unlikely to know stereotypes 
about Russian-only speakers, but those in Simferopol and Kherson were very likely to believe in 
such stereotypes. 
Looking at this question from the point of view of age groups, the younger group was 
slightly less likely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers than the older age group, but 
both groups were split fairly evenly on whether they believed the stereotypes or not.  However, 
the youth were more likely to know of stereotypes about Russian-only speakers and were far 
more likely to believe in the stereotypes.   
The data on stereotypes is surprising; except for the fact that young people are more 
likely to believe in stereotypes about Russian-only speakers than the older population, there is no 
clear explainable trend.  This may be because of the wording of the question in Russian, which 
used the borrowing стереотипы (stereotypes), which does not have the strong connotations in 
Russian as it does in English.  However, this is something that will need to be examined more 
thoroughly in the future. 
When asked about stereotypes in a different way, however, very clear trends became 
apparent.  Rather than asking recipients to describe stereotypes that they knew, this question 
asked for respondents to check off characteristics that they attributed to Ukrainian speakers.  The 
choices were illiterate, uncultured, simple, nationalistic, literate, cultured, and intellectual, with 
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multiple answers possible.  Some respondents chose not to answer at all, some marked every 
response, and many chose a few responses. 
Overall, the percent of positive responses about Ukrainian outnumbered the negative 
stereotypes.  Throughout the data, there is a strong correlation of speakers of the Ukrainian 
language and nationalism.  Many of the respondents wrote in answers about their feelings of 
patriotism toward Ukraine, even though there is no reason that a Russian native speaker might 
not love the country.  However, in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian 
nationalism has been strongly connected to the use of the Ukrainian language.  Thus, overall, it 
seems that the connection of Ukrainian to national pride and positive ideology are effectively 
managing the stereotypes that are being associated with Ukrainian speakers. 
 Regionally, those in Kyiv were overwhelmingly more likely to attribute positive 
characteristics to Ukrainian-only speakers, followed by Kherson, with Kharkov and Simferopol 
evenly matched.  Given that Kyiv attaches the most economic and political power to Ukrainian, 
this is to be expected; the stigma is likely to be on Russian speakers, and positive attributes 
assigned to Ukrainian speakers.  Kherson is, once again, pulled in many directions and likely to 
have positive feelings about Ukrainian, as dictated from above.  All of the regions except 
Simferopol reported approximately 1/3 negative stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, with 
Simferopol reporting far fewer.  Kherson, Kharkov, and Kyiv were also very similarly matched 
in terms of believing that Ukrainian-only speakers are nationalistic, at approximately ½ of 
respondents; 3/4 of respondents from Simferopol reported the same.  The data from Simferopol 
may be skewed because of the small sample size.   
 The responses, when broken down by age group, are quite similar to what we would 
expect.  The majority of the respondents aged 18-35, who likely attach economic and political 
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power to Ukrainian, felt positively about Ukrainian speakers, as opposed to less than half of 
those between the ages of 45 and 80.  The negative responses were fairly evenly matched, and 
approximately ½ of each group felt that Ukrainian speakers were nationalistic. 
 What is striking about these data is not the negative stereotypes, or lack thereof – both 
regionally and by age group, approximately 1/3 of respondents reported negative stereotypes 
about Ukrainian speakers, with little discrepancy amongst groups.  This suggests that little is 
changing in the way of negative stereotypes over time or geography.  In other words, the stigma 
that is attached to Ukrainian does not seem to vary depending on demographics, whereas the 
positive attributes and stereotypes differ greatly.  Looking at this from the point of view of 
stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination, it seems that while the social power that is connected to 
Russian is steady (and thus, the stigma and negative stereotypes are steady) regardless of 
demographics.  However, the economic and political power that is attached to Ukrainian, and 
thus, the positive attributes given to Ukrainian speakers, is being felt much more strongly 
amongst those who are in Kyiv and the youth.  In this case, it is clear that the policies and 
ideology that are being promoted from the central government are having a direct impact on the 
way that people feel about Ukrainian speakers.  Nationalism and language use are consistently 
approximately 50% throughout regions and age groups.  This suggests that the idea of 
nationalism being connected to language is not changing with time or geography, but is already a 
relatively stable concept. 
 Although the breakdown between genders did not show a noticeable trend up until this 
point, it is interesting to note that they follow the same general pattern as the subgroups above, 
with women being more susceptible to positive ideology about Ukrainian.  Both groups report 
approximately 1/3 negative stereotypes, and approximately ½ equate Ukrainian with nationalistic 
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tendencies.  However, women report positive attributes the vast majority of the time, and men 
attribute positive attributes only about 2/3 of the time.  This seems to indicate that Ukrainian 
women are more sensitive to the political and economic power that is being given to Ukrainian.   
 The final breakdown in this category is by self-identification, and it is very telling in 
terms of how linguistic stereotypes currently exist in society.  Whereas all of the other subgroups 
had similar numbers for negative stereotypes and nationalism, the group of people who identify 
by language were much more likely to believe negatively about Ukrainian speakers than those 
who identify based on geography.  Those who identify based on language were also much more 
likely to attribute nationalism to Ukrainian than those who identify based on geography, and 
much less likely to attach positive attributes to Ukrainian.  This suggests that there is a greater-
than-average social power attached to Russian for those who identify based on their native 
language, and a lower-than-average social power attached to Russian for those that identify 
based on the fact that they live in Ukraine. 
 The other variation in this set of data is that of nationalism and the Ukrainian language.  
Those who identify based on language report a connection of Ukrainian to nationalism 3/4 of the 
time, whereas those who identify based on geography report the same connection only about 1/3 
of the time, both of which are different from the data we received from any other breakdown of 
the data.  Those who identify based on their native Russian tongue may be feeling defensive and 
more in-tune to the nationalistic ideology that has been connected to Ukrainian; those who 
identify based on their geography, by nature of their self-identification, feel a certain amount of 
national pride, and, as they are native Russian speakers, may not believe in a strong connection 
between native language and national pride. 
Summary of discussion on linguistic attitudes and stereotypes 
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 Looking at the data, it becomes clear that there are forces at work both in favor of and 
against the Ukrainian language.  Linguistic attitudes, overall, are relatively positive about the 
Ukrainian language and its speakers, which is remarkable in and of itself, given the recent 
history of the language under the Soviet Union.   
 When we compare what is happening across different age groups, geographical regions, 
and identity groups, current trends of linguistic attitudes and stereotypes come into focus.  In 
terms of linguistic attitudes, the younger respondents and those in Kyiv (and, to some extent, 
Kherson) are more likely to feel positively about Ukrainian as a language, and to see it as its own 
language; this helps us to understand the way that positive attitudes about Ukrainian are moving 
geographically across the country from west to east, as well as through time, with the younger 
generation feeling more positively about Ukrainian.  Based on what we know about stigma, 
stereotypes, and discrimination, it seems that the youth and those in Kyiv are connecting more 
political and economic power to Ukrainian than those of other demographic groups.  This 
suggests that positive linguistic ideology is affecting the groups of people who are less strongly 
connected to the Russian language in their communities. 
In terms of stereotypes, we see similar results, with more positive stereotypes about 
Ukrainian speakers being held by the young and those who live in Kyiv, followed by those who 
live in Kherson.  What is interesting about the negative stereotypes is that they are consistent 
across age groups, geography, and gender, showing that there does not seem to be a change 
taking place in Ukraine with regards to negative stereotypes.  Similarly, nationalism is connected 
to Ukrainian speakers at the same rate regardless of demographics.  However, there are large 
differences based on demographics in the number of respondents who believe in positive 
stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers; thus, these positive attitudes are likely in the middle of 
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change, as certain categories of people in Ukraine have accepted the ideologies while others have 
not yet.  This suggests that the positive ideology about Ukrainian, and the connection of 
Ukrainian to political and economic power, is increasing over geography and time. 
Always important in the discussion of attitudes and stereotypes is the issue of self-
identification.  Although some trends are visible based solely on geographical region, age, and 
gender, positive and negative attitudes and stereotypes about Ukrainian and its speakers come 
sharply into focus when broken down by basis of self-identification:  those who identify based 
on their native Russian tongue are much more likely to feel negatively about Ukrainian and its 
speakers, and those who identify based on their geographic location are much more likely to feel 
positively about Ukrainian and its speakers.  Once again, this likely reflects the way that the 
respondents understand the linguistic power in Ukraine today. 
The political and ideological changes that are happening in Ukraine affect not simply the 
way that people view the language of the country, but also the way that people view each other.  
We have seen in this section that the positive ideology towards Ukrainian is changing the way 
that people view Ukrainian and each other, while for many, negative attitudes and stereotypes 
still hold true. 
Relevant research questions and hypotheses 
 Earlier in the paper, we laid out several relevant research questions; after looking at the 
data, we can now shed light on the answers to these questions. 
 First, we wondered how Ukrainians are currently identifying themselves.  It is obvious 
that Ukrainians are identifying themselves in multiple ways, and that there is no clear-cut 
answer.  Even in individuals, there is some fluidity between the way that they identify 
themselves to outsiders and the way that they feel inside.  However, the former role of the 
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identification in the passport is diminishing with time, and more Ukrainians are identifying 
themselves based on their language or the fact that they live in Ukraine.  Of those, more young 
people and people in Kyiv are likely to identify themselves based on the fact that they live in 
Ukraine, with respondents from Kherson not far behind.  Those in Simferopol and Kharkov, as 
well as older respondents, are more likely to identify themselves based on their native tongue.  
This split in how people identify themselves is more important in the explanation of different 
linguistic attitudes in Ukraine than the simple split of Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers. 
 In the course of determining how people identify themselves, it has become clear that, for 
many purposes, gender is not a significant factor in self-identification, although age and 
geography are.   
 We also posed a question about the connection of language attitudes and identity in 
Ukraine, and, in the course of the research, it has become very clear that language attitudes and 
self-identification are strongly correlated.  Those who identify themselves based on their native 
Russian tongue are much more likely to hold negative views and stereotypes about Ukrainian 
speakers than those who identify on the basis of geography, who are much more likely to 
connect positive attributes to Ukrainian and its speakers.   
We also listed several hypotheses earlier in the paper that should be revisited.  The first 
was an expectation that individuals suggest that both Ukrainian-speaking highlights certain 
characteristics of its speakers and that speakers of Ukrainian possess certain characteristics 
because they speak Ukrainian.  We found this to be true, with varying results.  Once again, the 
issue of self-identity is at the forefront with this question, as those who identify based on 
language are more likely to believe in negative stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers; they are 
also more likely to believe in a connection between nationalism and Ukrainian speakers, 
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meaning that those who feel strongly nationalistic are likely to choose Ukrainian.  Other 
respondents, who do not have as strong of a connection between identity and language, are also 
likely to believe certain stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, but they are much more likely to 
believe in positive stereotypes and characteristics. 
Second, we expected that some Russian speakers will perpetuate negative attitudes and 
stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers; this is absolutely true, and the 
correlation, as discussed above, is on what basis the speaker self-identifies.  If the speaker self-
identifies based on language, they are much more likely to perpetuate negative attitudes and 
stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers. 
Our third hypothesis was that the connection of language to national identity should be 
strongly felt; this was felt, across the board, by approximately half of the respondents.  This does 
not seem to be dependent on geography, age, or gender. 
Finally we expected different opinions based on age and geographic location, which was 
absolutely true.  Age and geographic location helped us to understand how the situation is 
changing over time and as Ukrainian spreads from west to east.  Additionally, basis of self-
identification played a large role in the way that people view Ukrainian, and gender, while 
generally not a distinguishing feature for language and identity, made a difference when it came 
to stereotypes about Ukrainian.   
Conclusion 
Russian speakers in Ukraine are in an interesting position.  Twenty years ago, Russian 
was the language of power, and, especially in cities and in the east, was the language of majority.  
During this time, the use of Ukrainian was often stigmatized, as many people believed that it was 
only fit for a peasant lifestyle and could not be used for serious work.  Now, however, the tables 
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have turned, and in many places, especially Western Ukraine, Russian is perceived as the 
language of the oppressors, or, at the very least, a symbol of life before independence.  
Ukrainian, on the other hand, has been connected by policy and ideology to national pride and 
independence. 
Because of the multilingual status of Ukraine, identity is constantly being negotiated; this 
is especially seen amongst Russian speakers living in regions with high levels of positive 
Ukrainian-based ideology, and amongst the younger subset of Russian speakers.  On the surface, 
it seems that there is a split in Ukraine based on native language, and there is; more importantly, 
however, is the way that people connect their identity to their language and their nation.  Those 
who connect their identity to Ukraine are increasingly showing positive attitudes and stereotypes 
toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers, while those who connect their identity to their 
native Russian tongue are more likely to perpetuate the old, negative stereotypes about 
Ukrainian. 
The linguistic situation in Ukraine is complicated and nuanced, but in understanding the 
way that identity affects people’s attitudes toward each other, we can more fully understand how 
stereotypes and attitudes, both positive and negative, arise in society, and how linguistic policy 
and ideology affects such phenomena.  Further, looking at changing identity and how this 
connects to attitudes and stereotypes allows us to better predict the direction in which Ukraine is 
heading, both in terms of time and geography; such understanding can also help to illuminate 
various multilingual situations the world over. 
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